Beguiled: Free Exercise Exemptions and the Siren Song of Liberalism by Bradley, Gerard V.




Beguiled: Free Exercise Exemptions and the Siren
Song of Liberalism
Gerard V. Bradley
Notre Dame Law School, gerard.v.bradley.16@nd.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, First Amendment Commons, and the Religion Law
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Publications at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by
an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Gerard V. Bradley, Beguiled: Free Exercise Exemptions and the Siren Song of Liberalism, 20 Hofstra L. Rev. 245 (1991).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship/782
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BEGUILED: FREE EXERCISE EXEMPTIONS AND
THE SIREN SONG OF LIBERALISM
Gerard V Bradley*
From all the talk about our religious pluralism-how extensive,
indelible, inarbitrable it is-one would expect that establishing one
definition of religious liberty would be the mother of all civic distur-
bances.
Wrong. We have a common definition of religious liberty. I can
demonstrate our agreement with one exhibit: the immensely broad-
based denunciation of the 1990 Supreme Court decision, Employment
Division v. Smith.' Two counsellors at a drug rehabilitation center
(Alfred Smith and Galen Black) appealed Oregon's denial of unem-
ployment benefits. Oregon cited the "misconduct" that led to their
discharges. Their "misconduct" consisted of using the hallucinogenic
drug peyote. Peyote was on Oregon's list of controlled substances;
using it was criminal. By ingesting it, Smith and Black also violated
the specific terms of their employment. Each was a recovering sub-
stance abuser. Each had previously agreed to remain absolutely drug
free.2
Justice Scalia summarized these facts for the Smith majority:
* Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law. Many thanks to Steve
Bainbridge, Robert George, John Garvey, Richard Myers, Steve Smith, Richard Neuhaus,
Michael Ariens, and Mark Tushnet for helpful suggestions.
1. 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
2. Smith v. Employment Div., 721 P.2d 445, 446 (Or. 1986); Black v. Employment
Div., 707 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Or. Ct. App. 1985), modified, 721 P.2d 451 (Or. 1986), rev'd,
799 P.2d 148 (Or. 1990).
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"[r~espondents ... were fired from their jobs ... because they in-
gested peyote for sacramental purposes at a ceremony of the Native
American Church, of which both are members. 3 The Court detected
no constitutional issue, and staked out no narrow grounds for so
holding. "[A]n individual's religious beliefs [do not] excuse him from
compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the
State is free to regulate."
4
The public and scholarly reactions to Smith have given new
meaning to the old prophecy "the lion shall lie down with the lamb."
Denouncing the decision were the mainline, liberal National Council
of Churches (NCC), the evangelical "new right," and the NCC's most
trenchant critic, Richard John Neuhaus.5 Both the neoconservative
American Jewish Committee (the Commentary crowd) and the liberal
American Jewish Congress condemned Smith,6 along with the Solici-
tor General of the United States Catholic Conference.7 The Baptist
Joint Committee and the Evangelical Lutheran Church added their
voices.8 Smith stimulated a petition for rehearing by a "who's who"
of constitutional lawyers.9 Three of them-with extensive contacts in
the churches-said there was "no dissent" in the religious community
over the need to overrule Smith."° They called it "a sweeping disas-
ter for religious liberty."'" The American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU), Norman Lear's People for the American Way, and the
American Humanist Association, among others, joined this ecumenical
chorus of critics. 2
Critic Michael McConnell says that Smith "is undoubtedly the
most important development in the law of religious freedom in de-
cades."' 3 But why? Not because Smith and Black lost. McConnell,
like most other critics, does not say that they should have won.
3. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1597-98.
4. Id. at 1600.





9. Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1109, 1111 (1990).
10. Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Douglas Laycock & Michael W. McConnell, An Open
Letter to the Religious Community, FIRST THINGS, Mar., 1991, at 44.
11. Id.
12. Harris, supra note 5, at 37.
13. McConnell, supra note 9, at 1111.
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Plaintiffs almost always lose these cases. 14 A few critics may be
rankled that Native American belief was so buffeted, supposing that
"mainstream religions" (evidently meaning Christianity) would have
fared differently. I doubt it. Nothing in the Smith opinion limits its
reach to fringe religions, and there is considerable debate about the
intrinsic tilt, if any, of accumulated judicial doctrine on the sub-
ject."
Revealingly, many critics hoist as their banner Justice
O'Connor's opinion 16 concurring in plaintiffs' defeat. For them, the
majority's analysis, not the outcome, is "the most important develop-
ment in the law of religious freedom in decades. ' 17 More exactly, it
is the majority's "non-analysis": Smith abandoned a doctrine that
comprised most of Free Exercise jurisprudence since 1963.18 I sub-
mit the following definition of religious liberty for our generation: the
government may not make or enforce any law that "substantially
burdens" religiously motivated conduct unless it is a narrowly tailored
means of achieving a compelling state interest.'9 Let us call this the
"conduct exemption." It started with Sherbert v. Verner" twenty-
nine years ago, and has apparently ended with Smith. Critics obvious-
ly consider it the linchpin of, if not synonymous with, "religious liber-
ty."21 Otherwise, Smith could be a "disaster" only for Free Exercise
doctrine since 1963.
I propose to defend Smith's abandonment of Sherbert, though not
all of its reasons for so doing. I agree with critics, like Justice
O'Connor, who argue that the majority opinion unreasonably under-
14. In a random survey of 100 pre-Smith cases (1979-1989), the plaintiffs' ledger was
approximately (due to difficulties in categorizing a few cases) 7 wins, 93 loses. One of the
victories was reversed by the Supreme Court. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988), rev'g 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986).
15. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 9, at 1135-36. As Richard Myers pointed out to
me in his comments on this Article, critics stress that mainstream religions do not ordinarily
find themselves in need of conduct exemptions, because statutes do not often place their
members in unfavorable predicaments like that of Smith and Black.
16. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1606-15.
17. McConnell, supra note 9, at 1111.
18. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1602-06.
19. See id. at 1608 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
20. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
21. See, e.g., Kenneth Matin, Employment Division v. Smith: The Supreme Court Alters
the State of Free Exercise Doctrine, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 1431, 1467 (1981) (commenting that
"Smith overruled Sherbert and its progeny and endorsed legislative indifference to the reli-
gious liberty rights of unpopular religions.").
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stated the solidity and scope of precedents since Sherbert.2 But
Smith rightly jettisoned the conduct exemption because it is manifest-
ly contrary to the plain meaning of the Free Exercise Clause, histori-
cally recovered and with 150 years of precedent up to Sherbert. The
conduct exemption, therefore, is bad constitutional law. It also is not,
strictly speaking, a doctrine of religious liberty. It is one aspect of
the post-World War II takeover of our civil liberties corpus by the
political morality of liberal individualism. The conduct exemption is
liberal political morality that, while hospitable to certain kinds of
religious commitment (basically, any religion that is "privatized") and
subversive of others,23 contains no doctrine of religious liberty as
such. The conduct exemption is, therefore, a very bad construction of
the Free Exercise Clause. Only with a lot of additional argument-so
far absent-can Smith be branded a disaster for "religious liberty."
Critics of Smith who are serious about constitutional law, or who
are not liberals, and especially critics who are both, should rethink
their position.
I
This part of the Article seeks the plain meaning of the Free
Exercise Clause, historically recovered. By "plain meaning," I mean
the standard or prevailing definition of terms, drawn from their cus-
tomary usage in the relevant field of discourse; in this case, that of
political and legal affairs. By "historically recovered," I mean the
"plain meaning" as apprehended by those who made the Free Exer-
cise Clause constitutionally operative-politically active Americans,
circa 1789-91, especially the state legislators who ratified it.24
This quest presupposes (at least to be ultimately persuasive) a
wider "originalistic" account of constitutional law in which "plain
meaning, historically recovered" is usually decisive of contemporary
meaning." Although originalism has some very able defenders
(Richard Kay,26 Earl Maltz,27 Christopher Wolfe),28 its detractors
22. See Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1603-06 nn.2-5, 1606-15.
23. For an extended argument in support of the proposition in the text, see Gerard V.
Bradley, Dogniaromachy-A "Privatization" Theory of the Religion Clause Cases, 30 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 275 (1986).
24. But see Stephen Pepper, Taking the Free Exercise Clause Seriously, 1986 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 299, 301.
25. I say "usually," because precedent-legislative, executive, and judicial-may warrant
adherence to a doctrine that scholarly investigation reveals to be not the original meaning.
26. See, e.g., Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional
[Vol. 20:245
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are legion. And most of its detractors do not take it seriously. They
consider it impossible (John Ely),29  intellectually naYve (Mark
Tushnet) 30  a cynical apology for a conservative political agenda
(William Brennan),31 or all of the above. And worse. A brief de-
fense of originalism is here necessary, lest this Article not be taken
seriously.
The initial stage of this defense distinguishes defensible from
indefensible "originalisms." Criticisms of originalism tend to be di-
rected at the latter, though it is sometimes hard to find anyone who
actually holds the originalist view under attack. Strawman or not, it is
important to emphasize that originalism presents no question of rule
by the "dead hand of the past." The choice of rulers, so to speak, is
between two sets of the living-legislators or judges. Like almost all
other disputes between originalists and proponents of a "living Consti-
tution," this one is about narrower versus considerably broader judi-
cial power to overturn laws and policies enacted by contemporary
lawmakers. Just so in Smith: do Oregon's legislators and administra-
tors decide unemployment benefits for Smith and Black, or do judg-
es?
Originalists should not care (though some do) what this or that
Framer would say about peyote use, drug laws, and religious beliefs.
Originalists should care very little about, for example, "Madison on
church and state," or "Madison in the great Virginia struggle over
general assessments for Christian teachers." What Madison understood
the Free Exercise Clause to mean-a different question-is a bit pro-
Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 226 (1988); Richard S.
Kay, The Illegality of the Constitution, 4 CONST. COMMENTARY 57 (1987).
27. See, e.g., Earl M. Maltz, The Failure of Attacks on Constitutional Originalism, 4
CONST. COMMENTARY 43 (1987); Earl M. Maltz, Foreword: The Appeal of Originalism, 1987
UTAH L. REv. 773; Earl M. Maltz, Some New Thoughts on an Old Problem-The Role of
the Intent of the Framers in Constitutional Theory, 63 B.U. L. REv. 811 (1983).
28. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERN JUDICIAL REVIEw: FROM
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION TO JUDGE-MADE LAW (1986) [hereinafter WOLFE, MODERN
JUDIcIAL REVIEw]; Christopher Wolfe, The Original Meaning of the Due Process Clause, in
THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ORIGINAL MEANING AND CURRENT UNDERSTANDING 213 (Eugene W.
Hickok, Jr. ed., 1991).
29. See JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 11-41 (1980).
30. See MARK V. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW (1988) (Chapter 4 is particularly relevant to this discussion.). But see
Christopher Wolfe, Grand Theories and Ambiguous Republican Critique: Tushnet on Consti-
tutional Law, 1991 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 831 (book review).
31. See William Brennan, The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratifica-
tion, Speech Delivered at Georgetown University (Oct. 12, 1985), in INTERPRETING THE
CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT 23, 25-26 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1990).
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bative of its original meaning. Originalists should care about that.
Originalists properly seek in the historical materials an intelligible
principle capable of guiding contemporary decision. (By historical
materials I mean chiefly the constitutional text, illumined by evidence
of its plain meaning to the ratifiers.) The rest of judging is up to the
living. The rest of judging includes the difficult tasks of identifying a
principle determinate enough to guide decision, then impartially and
adroitly applying the right, properly specified principle(s) to facts
skillfully adduced by legal practitioners in the course of litigation.
A defensible "originalism" would place almost no stock in its
most oft-cited defense: the "antidemocratic" or "countermajoritarian"
quality of judicial review.32 A defensible originalism would place
little stock in the distinction between law and politics, which corre-
sponds to the division of labor between courts and legislature.33
"Majoritarian" is an ambiguous term 34 with no intrinsic moral au-
thority. Moreover, it is hardly the animating feature of our Constitu-
tion that some originalists suppose it to be.35 Without additional pre-
mises, it does not even lead to "originalism," but to the "judicial re-
straint" constitutionalism of John Ely,36 Alexander Bickel,37 and
Robert Bork.38
The law/politics distinction is prone to a portion of the objection
just noted. It envisages politics as the tumultuous process from which
majoritarian preferences emerge out of an array of self-interested
proposals. The law/politics distinction also corresponds, in some usag-
es, to a dubious distinction between "reason" and "will." Legislators,
32. Perhaps the classic statement is Alexander Bickel's: "The root difficulty is that
judicial review is a counter-majoritarian force in our system." ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16 (1962); see also ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF
AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAw 139-41 (1990).
33. The law/politics distinction is pivotal to Bork's originalism. Consider the subtitle to
Bork's The Tempting of America, The Political Seduction of the Law. For a lengthy, largely
critical review of this book (and of the law/politics distinction), see Gerard V. Bradley,
Slaying the Dragon of Politics with the Sword of Law: Bork's Tempting of America, 1990 U.
ILL. L. REv. 243 (book review).
34. Gertrude E.M. Anscombe has shown how a majority can be in the minority on a
majority of occasions. See Gertrude E.M. Anscombe, On Frustration of the Majority by the
Fulfllment of the Majority's Will, in THE COLLECTED PHILosoPHIcAL PAPERS OF G.E.M.
ANSCOMBE 123-30 (1981).
35. See David M. O'Brien, The Framers' Muse on Republicanism, the Supreme Court,
and Pragmatic Constitutional Interpretivism, 53 REv. POL. 251 (1991).
36. See ELY, supra note 29.
37. See BICKEL, supra note 32.
38. See BORK, supra note 32.
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to secure their political fortunes, act at the behest of self-interested
constituents. A majority of them get their way because, well, they are
the majority. Their will is their warrant. Judges are distinguished
precisely by the tool of their trade: not willfulness or interest, but
reason.
Originalism is an account, basically a methodology, for constitu-
tional construction by courts. 9 Its defense presupposes a wider ac-
count of practical reason, and of what constitutes genuine human
flourishing." Its defense distinguishes legal reasoning from unre-
stricted practical reasoning. (Here is a solid foundation upon which to
build something like the law/politics distinction.) The former is a
highly specialized, institutionalized version of the latter. This artifici-
ality (or "artifactuality") is purposeful, and its main purpose is to
generate now a set of concepts, definitions, and rules to resolve, in
principle (but generally not in practice), all future social disputes.
Legal reasoning should enjoy significant autonomy from unrestricted
practical reasoning. Much of it will be arcane, completely technical.
That is basically why we have lawyers-to mediate this specialized
discourse to, and to make sure it serves, ordinary people.
Perhaps the greatest danger to a stable originalism is in keeping
this relationship true. It is not easy. Legal reasoning, despite relative
autonomy, is a kind of practical reasoning. Also, legal reasoning
serves goods established by reflection in the order of practical reason-
ing. Law is a cultural product that is designed to secure the good of
a just and harmonious social order. Law is, therefore, dependent for
its value, so to speak, upon an ethics antecedent and largely exterior
to itself.
The enduring temptation will be-and has been-judicial re-
course to the judge's preferred account of those antecedent principles;
his vote for the best political morality extant, or what he thinks his-
torically was the antecedent. Liberalism is most often the former,
natural rights most commonly the latter. Sometimes the roles are
reversed. At other times, "civic republicanism" or the lineaments of a
Christian commonwealth are added to the calculation. No matter.
Originalism's corrective is to focus upon the enactment-the constitu-
tional text. As one federal court aptly put it in the republic's early
39. Steven D. Smith, The Pursuit of Pragmatism, 100 YALE L.J. 409, 429 (1990).
40. See generally, JOHN Flnms, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIHTS (1980) [herein-





It is said [by counsel to warrant a judicial declaration of unconstitu-
tionality], that such a law is in contravention of unalienable rights;
and we have had quotations from elementary writers, and from the
bills of rights of the state constitutions, in support of this position.
The doctrines and declarations of those respectable writers, and in
those venerable instruments, are not to be slighted; but we are to
leave the wide field of general reasonings and abstract principles,
and are to consider the construction and operation of an express
compact, a government of convention.4
The various theoretical contentions of the Framers-whatever
they were-were melded into or supplanted for operational purposes
by the enactment. Here is refutation of criticisms that suppose that
originalism rests upon a naive assumption of homogeneity and unity
of viewpoint in the early republic. That criticism may hurt some
"original intent" theories that go beyond the text, and seek all pur-
pose direction from an undifferentiated mass of wise men called "the
Framers." But Forrest McDonald, who is no fan of judicial activism,
warns that
it is meaningless to say that the Framers intended this or that the
Framers intended that: their positions were diverse and, in many
particulars, incompatible. Some had firm, well-rounded plans, some
had strong convictions on only a few points, some had self-contra-
dictory ideas, some were guided only by vague ideals. Some of
their differences were subject to compromise; others were not.42
The constitutional text supplies unity amidst this undeniable diversity.
Though "enactment" is central to originalism, originalists are not
the positivists that many critics say they are.43 Originalism presup-
poses no positivist theory of law. Originalists do not claim that law,
including constitutional law, is beyond normative evaluation. Nothing
in a sound originalism denies that there are natural or inalienable
rights, some of them secured in the Bill of Rights. Originalism pre-
supposes no moral obligation on the part of contemporary judges,
legislators, or citizens to obey the "will" of the founders.
This misplaced criticism-that originalists must be
41. United States v. The William, 28 F. Cas. 614, 622 (D. Mass 1808) (No. 16,700).
42. FORREST MCDONALD, Novus ORDo SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINs OF THE
CONSTITUTION 224 (1985).
43. Critics include: HADLEY ARKEs, BEYOND THE CoNsTrrrUoN (1990); ELY, supra
note 29; Michael W. McConnell, Trashing Natural Law, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1991, at A23.
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positivists-presumes (in order to be a criticism rather than just an
observation) that positivism is defective. Positivism is defective if by
it is meant the command theory of law associated with Austin, and
(or) the moral skepticism of a Holmes. 4 Only some contemporary
positivists entertain such presuppositions. The presuppositions are not
components of the sophisticated and not obviously defective positiv-
ism of, say, H.L.A. Hart45 and Neil MacCormick.
46
The central concern of "posoriginalists" (my term for those who
identify originalism with positivism) seems to be that originalists set
constitutional law on a course that veers sharply from, or is entirely
indifferent to, some objectively correct or rationally cogent alternative
path. But path to, or of, what? Not constitutional law, at least not
without question-begging: its proper nature and direction is the matter
under investigation. Besides, originalism hardly lacks rationality or
objectivity of an important sort. Path for what, then? The best re-
gime, or the just polity, or the perfectly constructed commonwealth.
But originalists do not deny the cogency of such constructions.
Originalists do insist (as the preceding pages suggest they that would)
upon the proper autonomy of law, including constitutional law, from
unrestricted practical reasoning. Put a bit more decisively, neither
positivism nor its alternatives (such as natural law and natural rights)
is an interpretive theory. Originalism is.47 There may be some dif-
ference between the focal point of natural law theory and the focal
point of positivism, but neither is or purports to be a technique for
discerning the law of a particular political community (say, the Unit-
ed States) at a particular time (say, now).4"
"Posoriginalists" may still suspect that originalists (like this au-
thor) lack confidence in enactment-independent claims of reason.
Honestly, I do not. My rejoinder is that "posoriginalists" do not al-
low, as they should and I do, for the rationally underdetermined qual-
ity of most questions pertaining to the common good. Reason tells us
that there are a few objectively wrong ways to assemble the infinitely
complex ensemble of conditions conducive to human flourishing that
constitutes the common good of society's members. There is no one
44. Hadley Arkes does both. See ARKES, supra note 43.
45. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw (1961).
46. See NEIL MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY (1978).
47. David A.J. Richards, Originalism Without Foundations, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1373,
1402 (1990) (reviewing ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: TIE PoLITIcAL
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990)).
48. See FimNNs, supra note 40, at 3-55.
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correct way, and many more or less equally reasonable ones. It is by
supposing otherwise, that is, that reason commonly provides objec-
tively correct answers to questions of the common good, that
"posoriginalists" acquire most of the moral charge to their critique.
Now we can see the gleam in their eye. Originalists, abundantly
confident in reason, suppose that the Constitution is designed, funda-
mentally, to allocate jurisdiction. This is especially true of our federal
Constitution, which rests upon state responsibility for most govern-
mental tasks, and which divides national power among three branches.
Jurisdiction is the power authoritatively to choose from among many
competing reasonable proposals for directing the community's pursuit
of the common good. The point of our Constitution is to provide for
efficient, relatively clear resolution of jurisdictional questions precisely
so that the contending proposals do not upset the basic harmony and
stability of society. "Posoriginalists," because they tie constitutional
law (and law generally) so closely to a right/wrong account of the
common good, endanger that peace and harmony. They confuse the
focal points of positivism and constitutional law.
Originalists nevertheless acknowledge, with "posoriginalists," that
the Bill of Rights (and some other parts of the Constitution) recog-
nize natural rights. They agree that a few sections of the Constitution
recognize inalienable rights. These could not have been and were not
created by men, even operators so astute as the Framers. They are
not "true" by virtue of enactment. What men can do (and I think did
do in 1787-91) is reflect upon the narrower (but still critical) question
of how to secure natural rights within a stable, harnionious, and just
legal order. That question can be resolved only by enactment by a
constitutive power (in our political culture, "the people").
The important question-the one that does distinguish originalists
(who may be natural law or natural rights theorists) from most of
their critics-is to what extent judges ought to invalidate legislation
on the basis of principles of natural justice not fairly discoverable in
the text. Originalists insist that this is a prudential question not sig-
nificantly dependent on natural justice. Reasonable per-
sons-anticipating the kinds of individuals who would sit on the
bench, the intrinsic limits of the adjudicatory setting, the need for
impartially administered justice, and the inevitable diversity of views
over the demands of practical reason, among other factors-might
well constitute a government without judicial review at all.49 Such
49. See generally Joi Finnis, A Bill of Rights For Britain? The Moral of Contempo-
[Vol. 20:245254
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an arrangement, I think, offends no tenet of natural justice. And, in
light of Dred Scott v. Sandford," Plessy v. Ferguson,5' Lochner v.
New York,52 and Roe v. Wade,53 we might well wish the Framers
had done so. The main point is that no deduction from the existence
of natural rights (or natural law or natural justice or any other ac-
count of political morality justified by critical reason) to judicial re-
view is possible. Which is to affirm that the order of unrestricted
practical reasoning is distinct from that of legal reasoning.
Were it otherwise, there would be no good reason to entrust
authoritative exposition of the Constitution to persons who are legal
specialists-judges. I say this fully recognizing that all legal systems
are open, at some points, to the flow of unrestricted practical reason-
ing. It may be that construing a constitution, especially a bill of
rights, presents more such openings than anywhere else in a legal
system. From this, no judicial activism (of the type exemplified by
Roe v. Wade) follows. I am quite sure that Roe v. Wade-type
constitutionalism owes much more to the influence of contemporary
liberal philosophers (like Ronald Dworkin54 and John Rawls) 55 than
to any inquiry into our constitutional tradition. The
constitutionalism of Justice Robert Jackson is prototypical:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain sub-
jects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them
beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as
legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to life,
liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of wor-
ship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submit-
ted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections."7
Constitutional law is here understood as judicial vindication of
individual rights over and against legislative pursuit of collective
interests. Only the nonpolitical forum of principle-courts-can resist
the allure of, and depredations of, our majoritarian politics, whose
rary Jurisprudence, 71 PRoc. BRrr. AcAD. 303 (1985).
50. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
51. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
52. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
53. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
54. See RONALD DwoRxxN, A MArTE OF PRINCIPLE (1985); RONALD DwoRKIN, TAK-
INO RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
55. See JOHN RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
56. See infra Part III.
57. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
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wont is intolerance and conformity. But this construction is funda-
mentally at odds with the restricted nature of judicial review in ante-
bellum America and the constitutional tradition up to around World
War II. That is dispositive for originalists. But that does not finish
the job. The liberal construction is usually offered as a philosophical
critique of the constitutional tradition and as a reason to reject
originalism. If so, the construction is warranted, if at all, by critical
reason. From the standpoint of critical reason, it has been subjected
to cogent, even fatal, criticism by, for example, John Finnis58 and Rob-
ert George.59
Dissolution of this construction washes away most arguments
against originalism. And what effect upon the conduct exemption?
That doctrine has some specific meaning content (like exclusion of
perfectionist state policies), but it is, on the whole, a gigantic balanc-
ing test whose practical effect is to transfer power in bulk to the
judiciary. The purpose of the judicial calculations is not to arrive at a
correct, or necessarily more libertarian (in the specific sense of more
people getting more freedom from legal restraint), solution, but to
avoid one kind of wrong answer: any answer given finally (i.e. with-
out judicial review) by legislators. The conduct exemption thus exem-
plifies a common feature of the post-World War II corpus, as John
Finnis explains: "[W]hat is presented as a dispute about the 'legal
system' qua set of normative meaning-contents is in substance, typi-
cally, a dispute about the 'legal system' qua constitutional order of
institutions. 60
The conduct exemption is a "constitutional" question in the prop-
er sense of jurisdiction: power authoritatively to settle a question
concerning the common good. Jurisdiction marks the difference be-
tween an enforceable judicial decree and mere opining by a robed
editorialist. But what is the source of jurisdiction? Not political mo-
rality. We have seen that jurisdictional questions cannot be answered
by deduction from that starting point. Nor can it be up to judges to
decide-apart from extrinsic, authoritative sources-that theirs is the
power to decide. No one is obliged, legally or morally, to obey the
notices of someone else just because that figure hearkens all to draw
near and heed his commands.
58. Supra note 49 passinz.
59. Robert P. George, Individual Rights, Collective Interests, Public Law, and American
Politics, 8 LAw & PHIL. 245 (1989).
60. FINNis, supra note 40, at 356 (footnote omitted).
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The conduct exemption implies authoritative judicial resolution of
particular legal disputes. Its defenders are, therefore, obliged to identi-
fy the source of its authority, its jurisdictional pedigree. Congressional
statutes? Yes, as any lawyer who has practiced in federal court
knows. But why are the statutes authoritative? What is the source of
Congress's power? The Constitution, of course, rather plainly con-
strued.6 1
The point of this thought experiment is not to settle on a single,
finely-tuned series of regressing steps. My challenge is this: conduct
exemption defenders are courting self-refutation. They proclaim a
judicially enforceable rule of law binding us all. Very well. They
need justify that stance by a defensible methodology of constitutional
construction. If the defender is not simply mindless, he or she will
have to produce a chain of reasoning something like the above, one
resting ultimately in the terms of the constitutional enactment. I am
confident that that chain of reasoning will not, when deployed upon
the Free Exercise clause, produce the conduct exemption.
All that said, originalists recognize that judges will occasionally
encounter constitutional law that presents them with profound moral
questions. The judge may conclude that the principle of constitutional
law is unjust. What to do?
Two prominent escape options should be declined. One is sug-
gested by Ronald Dworkin's attempt to incorporate into the art of
judging both "fit" with traditional legal materials and precepts of
critical morality. 2 Since these two features are incommensurable,
Dworkin's solution is illusory.63 The other escape supposes that this
type of conflict gives rise to the difference between natural law and
positivism. Natural lawyers, this largely misguided account holds, say
that the unjust law is no law at all.6 Judging thus proceeds by
eliminating the legal horn of the dilemma. Positivists eliminate the
other horn. Skeptical or flatly dismissive of the claims of critical
reason (Holmes' "brooding omnipresence in the sky"),65 they blithely
rely upon the enactment.
Robert George explains how better to approach this question.
61. See U.S. CONST. art. I.
62. See RONALD DwoRxIN, LAw's EMPIRE (1986).
63. See John Finnis, On Reason and Authority in Law's Empire, 6 LAW & PHIL. 357
(1987).
64. But see Gerard V. Bradley, The Enduring Revolution: Law and Theology in the
Secular State, 39 EMORY L.J. 217, 245 (1990) (book review).
65. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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Treating Justice Scalia as an example of a non-positivist originalist,
George explains:
As I understand him, Scalia does not deny that there are objective
moral truths; nor does he deny that these truths are accessible to
reason; . . . nor does he deny that positive law (including constitu-
tional law) can be evaluated by reference to these truths; nor does
he deny that one must avoid complicity in the wrongdoing of oth-
ers .... How can a judge who believes in natural law hold that he
has a duty to render judgment in accord with positive law even
when the positive law in question is unjust (or otherwise immoral)?
According to natural law theorists, judges are under the same
obligations of truth telling that the rest of us are under. If the law
is in conflict with the natural law, the judge may not lie about it. If
his duty is to give judgment according to the positive law, then he
must either (i) do so or (ii) recuse himself. If he can give judgment
according to immoral positive law without rendering himself formal-
ly or unfairly material[ly] complicit in its immorality, and without
giving scandal, then he may licitly do so (though he may also licitly
recuse himself). If not, then he must recuse himself. (A great deal
of traditional casuistry has to do with problems of formal and mate-
rial complicity in wrongdoing.)6
This brief precis is probably longer than necessary to justify our
search for the original meaning of Free Exercise. True, from the con-
troversy over Bork's nomination and Scalia's emerging originalist
jurisprudence, you would think that lots of folks were flatly opposed
to, and had no use for, originalism. Not really. No one-not judge,
commentator, or academic-denies its relevance to constitutional law.
Just about everyone is an originalist to some degree, including former
Justices Brennan and Marshall.67 In many cases, all the Justices
agree that the original meaning is presently dispositive.6' Enough
said about whether the historical excursion awaiting the reader is
justified.
We want to know if the conduct exemption is the plain meaning,
historically recovered, of the Free Exercise Clause. And if not, what
66. Sanford Levinson, The Confrontation of Religious Faith and Civil Religion: Catho-
lics Becoming Justices, 39 DEPAuL L. REv. 1047, 1075-76 n.85 (1990) (quoting letter from
Robert George to Sanford Levison (Apr. 3, 1990)).
67. See, e.g., McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 485-90 (1985) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring).




is? But we are immediately confounded: what is the conduct exemp-
tion? What does it mean?
Is "religion," as the term is used in the Free Exercise Clause, all
theistic belief systems? Theistic systems that contemplate a transcen-
dent personal god who issues commands or otherwise possesses a will
relevant to humans, just so that conflicting obligations may arise?
What constitutes a "burden"? Is it burdensome to know that in the
government's files is your social security number? What if you think
that numbers are the mark of the Beast, as the Book of Revelation
may tell us?69 Or that numbers diminish your spirit, as the Native
American plaintiff in Bowen v. Roy70 alleged?
What are "legitimate governmental interests," and which ones are
"compelling?" Can an exceptionless distribution of a burden, like
eligibility for military conscription, ever be a compelling interest?
Does "necessary" really require that no alternative exists? What of
competing demands on government resources? Do they foreclose
alternatives? If "necessary" means, rather, "appropriate, given all other
constraints, demands, entitlements and plans," why not just eliminate
the middlemen (all non-judicial government policymakers) and put
judges in charge from the get-go?
Defenders of the conduct exemption do not deny that it is a bit
fuzzy. Michael McConnell suggests this clarification: "maximum free-
dom for religious practice consistent with demands of public or-
der."7 1 But who disagrees with that? No one rationally can, because
it is purely formal, like saying "there shall be no unjustified burdens
upon religion." What is formal about it is that all of the substance is
suppressed. Most significantly suppressed is: in what does public
order consist? That no one has gotten a bloody nose? Does it include
legal protection of the aesthetic, or moral, or religious sensibilities of
all? Of a majority?
Even so appealing a formulation as Madison's (which McConnell
endorses), "that free exercise should be protected in every case where
it does not trespass on private rights or the public peace, 72 is in-
conclusive. Do the people enjoy a collective right to a decent soci-
ety? Does the government rightly constrain the religious practices of
69. See Leahy v. District of Columbia, 833 F.2d 1046, 1048 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
70. 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
71. McConnell, supra note 9, at 1111.




one or more persons when it makes impossible a cultural order sup-
portive of the conscientious practices of the vast majority?
Does public order extend to a shared religious outlook? To com-
mon moral precepts? Does the right of conscience include an immu-
nity from state interference with actions that, while self-regarding, are
objectively immoral? Is there, in other words, a free exercise right to
do a moral wrong, like ritual self-immolation, or to have adulterous
sexual relations? Americans in the founding and antebellum eras
thought not. Both "licentiousness" and "public peace and order" con-
ditioned and limited the religious liberty that they enjoyed.73 They
thought that they enjoyed a nearly perfect freedom of conscience.74
And they brought blasphemy prosecutions, and compelled ministerial
support, as well as sabbath observance.75 Quite likely, McConnell
means "public order" to exclude all perfectionistic state action, in
favor of liberal neutrality. Be that as it may, we need to know if that
corresponds to the original understanding. Already, the answer appears
to be no.
Stated as it was in Sherbert, the conduct exemption is a symbol
of unexpressed commitments, an opaque herald of things to come, a
trumpet blast promising that something (or someone) important fol-
lows. 76 We need to unpack its conceptual baggage, spread out its
load of definitions, its concept of rights, its political maxims and
empirical generalizations about human nature, and more. We especial-
ly need to know its account of justice, and whether the polity may
aspire to more than justice among individuals, whether it may pro-
mote the genuine flourishing of individuals. Without such differentia-
tion and clarification, the historical search cannot get going.
We cannot (so far) seek the historical pedigree of the "conduct
exemption," because we do not know what we are looking for. It is
one of those things that has to be discussed retail, not wholesale.
Here is the insight of Justice Scalia's insistence in Smith (in other
ways unconvincing) that we do not have a "conduct exemption" doc-
trine at all.77 Scalia allowed that we have an unemployment benefits
and religion doctrine, 78 and some "hybrids" resembling the conduct
73. See infra notes 148-265 and accompanying text.
74. See id.
75. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free
Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1503 (1990).
76. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
77. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1600-06 (1990).
78. Id. at 1602-03.
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exemption.' 5 In any event, the phenomenon known as the conduct
exemption is a series of discreet propositions yet to be described.
I have broken the conduct exemption into four components: first,
the class of actions eligible for protection (what is protected); second,
the reasons that may justifiably burden that class of actions (the
scope or nature of the protection); third, the institutional custodian of
this calculation (who is the protector-courts or legislators?); and
fourth, the basic objective of these protections (expressed without
using terms to be defined). Thus, the "conduct exemption" comprises
the "religiously motivated conduct" of individuals, not just
intracommunal or ritual actions. It may justifiably be burdened for a
limited number of extraordinary reasons, excluding perfectionist rea-
sons, or what are called moral laws. Courts, and not legislatures,
make this calculation. Finally, the objective is "religious liberty,"
defined as what happens when government provides no reason to
practice or adopt any particular religious perspective. "Neutrality of
effect" is a convenient expression for this objective.
Other differentiations are possible. One, emphasizing "burden,"
and another, the remarkable fact that the construct gets by without
defining "religion," suggest themselves. Mine is nevertheless sufficient
to permit historical investigation without preanalytical prejudice.
II
The controverted constitutional provision reads, "Congress shall
make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise" of religion." The
Smith Court spent most of its time arguing against one interpretation
of it, the conduct exemption. But without identifying it as such, and
without historical argument, the Court came close to expressing the
meaning apprehended by the ratifiers:
[A]ssembling with others for a worship service, participating in
sacramental use of bread and wine, proselytizing, abstaining from
certain foods or certain modes of transportation .... [A] state
would be "prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]" if it sought to
ban such acts ... only when they are engaged in for religious rea-
sons, or only because of the religious belief that they display.8'
The decisive feature is not the conduct exemption's "neutrality of
79. Id. at 1601-02.
80. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
81. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1599 (emphasis added).
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effect," but, rather, what might be called "neutrality of reasons." John
Locke provided a useful illustration, albeit long before the founding
of the Constitution and a very long time before Smith:
[I]f any people congregated upon account of religion should be
desirous to sacrifice a calf, I deny that that ought to be prohibited
by a law. Meliboeus, whose calf it is, may lawfully kill his calf at
home, and burn any part of it that he thinks fit. For no injury is
thereby done to any one, no prejudice to another man's goods. And
for the same reason he may kill his calf also in a religious meeting.
Whether the doing so be well-pleasing to God or no, it is their part
to consider that do it .... But if peradventure such were the state
of things that the interest of the commonwealth required all slaugh-
ter of beasts should be forborne for some while, in order to the
increasing of the stock of cattle that had been destroyed by some
extraordinary murrain, who sees not that the magistrate, in such a
case, may forbid all his subjects to kill any calves for any use
whatsoever? Only 'tis to be observed, that in this case the law is
not made about a religious, but a political matter; nor is the sacri-
fice, but the slaughter of calves, thereby prohibited.82
There are cases directly on point. A federal court recently enter-
tained a Free Exercise challenge to a municipal ordinance that for-
bade the ritual slaughter of animals, but that did not proscribe
slaughter for sport or food. The court, incorrectly in my view, upheld
the ordinance.83 Applying "neutrality of reasons" analysis to the
facts of Smith, if Oregon generally allowed peyote use, but denied it
only to Native Americans for ritual use, then Free Exercise was vio-
lated. As long as peyote use was generally prohibited, however, its
use for religious reasons could be validly forbidden as well.
Nothing in this idea (and nothing in the Constitution) prohibits
relief from neutral, generally applicable laws for conscientious objec-
tors by legislative accommodation. This is precisely how almost half
of the states and the federal government, 4 and recently Oregon, 85
have responded to ritual use of peyote. "Neutrality of reasons" is not
82. Jeremy Waldron, Autonomy and Perfectionisn in Raz's "Morality of Freedom, " 62
S. CAL. L. REv. 1098, 1134 (1989) (quoting JoHN LOCKE, A Letter Concerning Toleration,
Its LOCKE: THE SECOND TREATIsE OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION
147-48 (J.W. Gough ed., 1976)).
83. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. 1467
(S.D. Fla. 1989).
84. See McConnell, supra note 9, at 1113.




maintained because it is a "ratchet" protection against legislative sup-
position of false belief. Although that may typically be the case,
"neutrality of reasons" is abided because accommodation supposes
neither the falsity nor the truth of religious propositions. It supposes
only that the person whose action is religiously motivated is behaving
differently from the person who performs the same action (viewed
behaviorally) for other reasons.
86
This distinction possesses intrinsic force. Suppose that two indi-
viduals who are otherwise healthy, but who require blood transfu-
sions, reside in a jurisdiction that prohibits suicide. Without the trans-
fusion, each will die. With the transfusion, each will regain robust
health. Each is twenty-five years old, and each refuses the transfu-
sion. One does so because he is depressed and wants to die. His
refusal thus encompasses a choice to die, and his plan will be accom-
plished by refusing to receive blood. He evinces the belief that life is
not always a basic human good and that death is not always an evil.
This person's death would be suicide. In our hypothetical jurisdiction,
he violates the law, and probably should be transfused against his
will.
The other person knows that he will die without the transfusion,
and willingly accepts that eventuality. He refuses for a different rea-
son: as a Jehovah's Witness, he cannot conscientiously take the blood
of another into his system. This person wants to continue living, does
not choose death, and would prefer to attain the object of his
plan-religious duty-without dying. This person's death would not
be a suicide. He is not intentionally taking an innocent human life;
he is being faithful to God. In my view, he does not break the law
and probably should not be transfused against his will.
Nothing in this example presupposes Sherbert,87 the Free Exer-
cise Clause, or any other enactment save the suicide prohibition. For
reasons similar to those advanced in the suicide example, Christian
Scientist parents who rely unavailingly upon spiritual healing for a
diseased child do not commit any direct killing, even though parents
making the same decision for other reasons probably would. Whether
or not Christian Scientist parents are guilty of negligent homicide is a
different, more difficult question, but it can and should be answered
by the conduct exemption doctrine.
This neutrality of reasons is the defining feature of Smith's Free
86. See Waldron, supra note 82, at 1135.
87. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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Exercise analysis, and it corresponds to the plain meaning, historically
recovered. But it is not the only feature for Smith, and for the ratifi-
ers. The Smith Court was less than precise about the class of actions
eligible for this protection. Justice Scalia started out with worship and
liturgy-both intracommunal collective actions-but trailed off into,
seemingly, all divinely enjoined, or possibly all religiously motivated,
conduct.88 He seemed to adopt a believer-centered account of eli-
gibility: the list is as long as our pluralism can make it."
Scalia overshot the mark. For practical purposes, in the founding
and antebellum eras, neutrality of reasons pertained to "worship,"
widely construed to include both doctrine and church discipline as
well. All of these functions are intracommunal group actions-things
that churches, not untethered individuals, do.
Why should we think that Scalia got the central fea-
ture-neutrality of reasons-right? Well, we know Locke was a pro-
found influence upon the Framers of our Constitution, and there is no
doubt that the Bill of Rights was proposed, adopted, and ratified with
the objective of securing, against a new government, old, familiar
rights.9" True, Locke excluded from his scheme of toleration several
classes of persons, including, most notably, Roman Catholics and
atheists, but there are plenty of echoes of that in the founding, too.
That is hardly a persuasive case. Further discussion takes the
form of an extended conversation with Michael McConnell's The
Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion.9
Why? Because McConnell's is the best originalist case made as yet,
and the best likely to be made in the near future, for the conduct
exemption. If it is unpersuasive-as I contend that it is-then we
may conclude that the conduct exemption cannot be supported histori-
cally. If the conduct exemption is not the original meaning, it does
not follow that anything else, in particular, is. But McConnell's piece
is, in significant part, a discussion of the only plausible historical
alternative: neutrality of reasons.
McConnell demonstrates that two views, with a limited number
of contemporary supporters, are contradicted by the historical evi-
dence. McConnell is right that some action, and not just belief, was
88. See supra text accompanying note 81.
89. See Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595.
90. See, e.g., GERARD V. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA 69-120
(1987); DONALD S. LuTz, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUtoINALISM (1988).
91. See McConnell, supra note 75.
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protected.92 He is also right that the Establishment Clause did not
prohibit legislative exemptions.93 But on the critical question of his-
torical support for judicially crafted exemptions from general
law-Sherbert-McConnell's conclusion is surprisingly guarded:
Without overstating the force of the evidence, however, it is possi-
ble to say that the modem doctrine of free exercise exemptions is
more consistent with the original understanding than is a position
that leads only to the facial neutrality of legislation.
94
Elsewhere, "constitutionally compelled exemptions were within
the contemplation of the framers and ratifiers as a possible interpreta-
tion of the free exercise clause .. . .While the historical evidence
may not be unequivocal (it seldom is), it does, on balance, support
Sherbert's interpretation of the free exercise clause." 95
McConnell dramatically overstates the strength of his evidence.
Even so, one wonders how much evidence of original understanding
is sufficient to authorize judicial invalidation of legislation (or, in this
context, judicially crafted exemptions from legislation). McConnell
seems to think that a preponderance of the evidence is enough. I
think not, especially given the undeniable, long tradition of judicial
interpretation to the contrary.
Momentarily, I will treat in detail the dispositive body of evi-
dence: antebellum judicial interpretation, both state and federal, of
constitutional guarantees of the free exercise of religion. That evi-
dence is a significant but limited portion of McConnell's article. He
spends much time recounting patterns of church/state thought and le-
gal/constitutional behavior in the colonies, and in the early repub-
lic.96 He emphasizes the religious underpinnings of the colonists'
and early republicans' political thought.97 He concludes that this evi-
dence is "consonant" with conduct exemptions.98
McConnell seems to think that showing that a religious concep-
tion of duty to God propelled our tradition of liberty of conscience
verifies the conduct exemption. A short but sufficient response to this
92. Id. at 1459.
93. See Michael W. McConnell, A Response to Professor Marshall, 58 U. CH. L. REV.
329 n.12 (1991).
94. McConnell, supra note 75, at 1512.
95. Id. at 1415.
96. Id. at 1421-73.
97. See id. passim.
98. Id. at 1415.
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reasoning is that the evidence is "consonant" with Scalia's rendering
of free exercise, and Locke's as well. A longer answer would build
upon my earlier observation that unrestricted practical thought is re-
fracted along its passage into law and legal reasoning. There is no
straight path between the most obstreperous conscientious objection
and the conduct exemption. Roger Williams is likely the great dis-
senter in our historical tradition; certainly no one in our history has
placed religious duty closer to the center of his political thought. Yet,
Williams was politically an authoritarian, and would have none of
Sherbert, including that case's notion of solicitation of conscience.99
The point is not to debate Williams' significance for the Fram-
ers. McConnell suggests (correctly) that it was not much."r The
point is to suggest, using Williams as an example, that the "interrela-
tion between the claims of a limited government and a sovereign
God" t -and Williams surely believed in both-is no premise for
concluding anything about Smith's historical antecedents. One might
believe in both concepts, yet oppose a written constitution, judicial
review, or both! Almost all of McConnell's remaining evidence (aside
from the judicial corpus examined below) is either inapposite or con-
trary to his conclusion. McConnell relates accommodations of reli-
99. DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION iN THE SUPREME CoURT (1985).
There goes many a ship to sea, with many hundred souls in one ship, whose weal
and woe is common, and is a true picture of a commonwealth, or a human combi-
nation or society. It hath fallen out sometimes, that both papists and protestants,
Jews and Turks, may be embarked in one ship; upon which supposal I affirm, that
all the liberty of conscience, that ever I pleaded for, turns upon these two hing-
es-that none of the papists, protestants, Jews, or Turks, be forced to come to the
ship's prayers or worship, nor compelled from their own particular prayers or wor-
ship, if they practice any. I further add, that I never denied, that notwithstanding
this liberty, the commander of this ship ought to command the ship's course, yea,
and also command that justice, peace and sobriety, be kept and practiced, both
among the seamen and all the passengers. If any of the seamen refuse to perform
their services, or passengers to pay their freight; if any refuse to help, in person or
purse, towards the common charges or defence; if any refuse to obey the common
laws and orders of the ship, concerning their common peace of preservation; if any
shall mutiny and rise up against their commanders and officers; . . . because all
are equal in Christ, therefore no masters nor officers, no laws nor orders, nor cor-
rections nor punishments;-I say, I never denied, but in such cases, whatever is
pretended, the commander or commanders may judge, resist, compel and punish
such transgressors, according to their deserts and merits.
Id. at 441 n.73 (quoting Roger Williams, in ANsoN P. STOKES & LEO PEFPFER, CHURCH
AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 15 (1964)).
100. See McConnell, supra note 75, at 1426-27.
101. Id. at 1415.
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gious conscience by colonial and state governments.10 2 He notes a
First Congress episode that "strongly suggests that the general idea of
free exercise exemptions was part of the legal culture. 103 He con-
cludes, reasonably enough, that "exemptions on account of religious
scruple should have been familiar to the framers and ratifiers of the
free exercise clause."0'4 But "an obvious objection to all these ex-
amples would be that they were initiated by the legislature."' 5
Thus, McConnell has adduced no instance of a judicially crafted con-
duct exemption.
How do we get Sherbert out of legislative accommodations?
Certainly, one needs to argue for it. But McConnell simply chooses
to make "accommodation" analytically active, and chooses to treat
"legislative" as a mere variable modifier. Why not reverse priorities?
Why assume that they are severable at all? McConnell does not say.
"Legislative accommodation" may actually have been a single term
designating an intrinsically political (non-legal) calculation. McConnell
would agree that there was an abrupt change of events between 1790
and 1800. How abrupt? Assuming, contrary to historical fact, that
"legislative accommodation" amounts roughly to the conduct exemp-
tion, this meaning would first have to be constitutionalized in the
Free Exercise Clause, and then judicialized (they are two separate
steps, because we cannot rule out, as a matter of interpretive princi-
ple, that some constitutional constraints are judicially unenforceable).
This is all possible, and may have occurred. But, given that the back-
ground is entirely colored by "legislative accommodation," the abrupt
turn would have left a measurable historical path.
McConnell has a difficult chore ahead of him. His strategy is
bold. He supposes that legislative accommodations passed to the judi-
ciary! "Once the people empowered the courts to enforce the bound-
ary between individual rights and the magistrate's power, they en-
trusted the courts with a responsibility that prior to 1789 had been
exercised only by the legislature."'" "[T]he advent of judicial re-
view had transformed a principle of free exercise previously enforced
solely through legislative action into one enforceable through the
courts."' 0 7 McConnell cites no supporting evidence from the ratify-
102. Id. at 1466-73.
103. Id. at 1501.
104. Id. at 1511.
105. Id. at 1473.
106. Id. at 1445.
107. Id. at 1510.
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ing debates, and allows that the Congressional debates said nothing
about judicially crafted exemptions. °8 He allows that the First Con-
gress debated and failed to pass an amendment that would have ex-
empted any person "religiously scrupulous of bearing arms" from
service in state militias.' If free exercise were thought to address
that issue, why separate consideration? McConnell suggests imagin-
able alternatives."0 But the least fanciful is that free exercise did
not include exemption from militia service for conscientious objec-
tors.
111
There are deeper difficulties with McConnell's reliance upon
"judicial review." I have placed his key justificatory paragraphs in the
notes. These paragraphs abound with simple assertions regarding
108. Id. at 1500.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1501.
111. Id. at 1501.
112. Id. at 1444-45.
Judicial Review.-One reason that Locke's doctrines may have seemed so
limited from an American perspective is that he did not envision an authority with-
in the law that was capable of limiting the sovereign power of the -magistrate
(by which he meant the government, the King, and Parliament). "Mhere is no
judge upon earth between the supreme magistrate and the people." While Locke
recognized the moral imperative to obey God instead of civil rulers, his conception
of political institutions did not include a mediator who could transform this moral,
prepolitical right into positive law. In the absence of such a mediator, individual
conscience could be compelled to yield to government in the event of a conflict.
For Locke, the field left to untrammeled conscience could only extend to that in
which the civil magistrate had no particular interest-principally, to things pertain-
ing to the world to come. Religious liberty could only be defined negatively; any
broader definition would be pointless, since the magistrate would be judge of his
own powers.
Locke's key assumption of legislative supremacy no longer holds under a
written constitution with judicial review. The revolutionary American contribution to
political theory was that the people themselves are sovereign and therefore possess
inherent power to limit the power of the magistrate, through a written constitution
enforced by judges independent of the legislature and executive. As Madison would
predict during deliberation over the Bill of Rights:
If [the provisions of the Bill of Rights] are incorporated into the constitu-
tion, independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar
manner the guardians of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark
against every assumption of power in the legislative or executive; they will
be naturally led to resist every encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated
for in the constitution by the declaration of rights.
Once the courts are vested with the power to determine the proper bound-
ary between individual conscience and the magistrate's authority, based on the
words of a written charter derived from the people, fuller protection for conscience
becomes conceivable. An independent judiciary could define religious liberty affir-
matively, in terms of what religious liberty requires, and not merely what the leg-
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matters most in need of proof. They are bereft of authority, save for
the misconceived reliance on Madison.!"3 Other difficulties include
the fact that, whatever Locke's doctrine, it hardly follows that the
modem judicial restraint position "is a relic of Lockean legislative su-
premacy. '1 4 That "relic" can be, and has been, defended upon
many distinctly non-Lockean grounds. Are we to think that the "relic"
survived until 1963? If not, and if the "conduct exemption" was not
born until then, it is probably because less antiquated reasons under-
girded free exercise law. In addition, McConnell marries popular
sovereignty to judicial review with a written constitution as the mari-
tal bond. But the sovereign people can, and did, limit the power of
all three branches of government provided in the Constitution. His
assertion that judges practically were loyal aides-de-camp of the sov-
ereign people is simply an anachronism. How can this triumph of
judicial control of the legislature be squared with legislative control
of access to the courts? Giving Congress control of jurisdiction would
thus be similar to giving inmates the keys to the jail. The plausible
opening question would therefore be: where in the document did the
people authorize courts to enforce the bundle of notions known as the
"conduct exemption" over against other branches?
Perhaps it appears in the Free Exercise Clause? If so, the ques-
tion-begging is apparent. "Judicial review" is a doctrine about insti-
tutions, and the "conduct exemption" is the asserted meaning content
of a constitutional provision. No change in the former, in and of
itself, affects the latter. Thus, McConnell is left with the task at hand:
getting the conduct exemption into the Free Exercise clause. Further,
there is no necessary connection between a written constitution, "mor-
al" and "prepolitical" rights, and judicial review. Part I of this Article
says as much. And, notwithstanding Marbury v. Madison,"' the
fundamental issue in the early years of the Republic was not that the
.people had expressed limitations on the government in a written con-
stitution, but how to enforce them. An obvious possibility was
islature concedes. The modem "judicial restraint" position, that legislatures are enti-
tled to make free exercise exemptions but courts are not, is a relic of Lockean
legislative supremacy. Once the people empowered the courts to enforce the bound-
ary between individual rights and the magistrate's power, they entrusted the courts
with a responsibility that prior to 1789 had been exercised only by the legislature.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
113. See infra note 123 and accompanying text.
114. McConnell, supra note 75, at 1445.
115. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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through the actions of the people. Another means was state enforce-
ment through nullification, and secession. 6 True, Madison under-
stood the importance of judicial review to the constitutional scheme.
But he seems to have regarded it as an umpire only for federal-ver-
sus-state disputes, and not for individual-versus-government disputes.
Madison still subscribed, in 1798, to the compact theory of the union,
a theory that implied state enforcement of constitutional constraints
upon Congress." 7 He did, however, deny Jefferson's claim that nul-
lification was an appropriate means of such state enforcement .
8
McConnell neglects a delicious irony in Madison's evolving
views on judicial review and the Bill of Rights. As is commonly
recognized, Madison initially resisted the movement for such guaran-
tees. After much prodding from Jefferson (a Lockean relic, by
McConnell's reckoning), Madison finally admitted their usefulness.
His political survival in a congressional race with James Monroe
added to the appeal of Jefferson's arguments." 9 But, even then,
Madison did not-think of judicial review. Jefferson had to point that
out to him too. The congressional speech excerpted by McConnell is,
116. Consider this excerpt from one 1808 federal court opinion:
But, should usurpation rear its head; should the unnatural case ever occur, when
the representatives of the people should betray their constituents, we are referred,
for consolation and remedy, to the power and vigilance of the state governments;
to publick opinion; to the active agency of the people in their elections; to that
perpetual dependence on the people, which is the primary control on the govern-
ment; "to the vigilant and manly spirit, which actuates the people of America, a
spirit which nourishes freedom, and, in return, is nourished by it;" and, in case of
desperate extremities, for which no system of government can provide, "to that
original right of self-defence, which is paramount to all positive forms of govern-
ment." In one passage, indeed, where the writer is speaking of the resort, in case
of a supposed usurpation, we are referred to the judiciary and to the executive, as
well as to the people, without any discrimination of the circumstances to which the
different sources of remedy would be applicable. "In the first instance," says the
writer, "the success of the usurpation will depend on the executive and judiciary
departments, which are to expound and to give effect to the legislative acts; and,
in the last resort, a remedy must be obtained from the people, who can, by the
election of more faithful representatives, annul the acts of the usurpers.-
United States v. The William, 28 F. Cas. 614, 619 (D. Mass. 1808) (No. 16,700) (citations
omitted).
117. See, e.g., JAMES MADISON, The Virginia Resolutions of 1798, in 4 LETTERS AND
OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 506-07 (Congress ed. 1865).
118. See Adrienne Koch & Harry Ammon, The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions: An
Episode in Jefferson's and Madison's Defense of Civil Liberties, 5 WM. & MARY Q. 145,
157-62. (1948).
119. See BRADLEY, supra note 90, at 85-86.
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therefore, the product of Jefferson's influence upon Madison.' 20 Jef-
ferson, the bad guy in McConnell's narrative, is the force behind
McConnell's prime exhibit.
The central difficulty is McConnell's undifferentiated use of the
term "judicial review." It plagues this passage and the entire article.
The question is not the existence of judicial review or its basic legiti-
macy. Of that there is no doubt, at least as of 1789. The interesting
historical issues are the nature, scope, and purpose of judicial review,
and how answers to those questions affect the plausibility of the con-
duct exemption. Put bluntly, there is no such thing as "judicial re-
view" simpliciter, though McConnell acts as if there is. He assumes
that judicial review in the early Republic was, or included, the con-
duct exemption. It did neither.
What if "judicial review" simply meant that a law was "null"
and "void," a failed attempt at lawmaking? What if the all but uni-
versally proclaimed scope of judicial review was "plain error": courts
might void legislative action only when it was clearly, undeniably
contrary to the obvious meaning of the constitutional text? 2' What
if the purpose of judicial review was not to protect individuals
against majorities, but to protect everyone against faithless legisla-
tors? 122 What if all three of the above correspond to the Framers'
understanding of judicial review? What if that understanding persisted
throughout the antebellum era? If the answers to all of the above
questions are affirmative, we have a "judicial review" that does not
resemble the conduct exemption. Given the intricate and multifaceted
balancing act that it is, how could legislative action be "unambigu-
ously" contrary to the "plain meaning" of the text?
The "judicial review" strategy is futile unless McConnell shows
that what was debated as "judicial review" is very much like the
conduct exemption. McConnell recognizes that "judicial review" is
judicial authority "to declare void unconstitutional acts of the legisla-
ture."'123 That is pretty close to what contemporaries said it was, but
it does not describe conduct exemptions. McConnell defines that as
exemption from enforcement of a law that is not void, but is general-
120. O'Brien, supra note 35, at 269-72.
121. This was the situation as Justice Marshall presented it in Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); see also United States v. The William, 28 F. Cas. 614, 617 (D.
Mass. 1808) (No. 16,700) (citing examples of this standard for judicial review). See generally
WoLFE, MODERN JuDIcIAL REvIEw, supra note 28, at 17-117.
122. See infra notes 246-56 and accompanying text.
123. McConnell, supra note 75, at 1507.
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ly valid and applicable.'24
The point is worth pursuing because I think McConnell's use of
"judicial review" is a rhetorically pivotal red herring. We had judicial
review from the beginning, but conduct exemptions started in the late
twentieth century. Historically, judicial review emerged as a corollary
of restricted legal reasoning, along the lines originalists suppose it
should have. The conduct exemption is no restricted legal-technical
operation. It is, therefore, unlikely to have been embraced by early
national use of the term "judicial review."
There is one sure way to find out who is right-go to the cases.
If the drafters and ratifiers of 1789-91 entertained apprehensions of
the Free Exercise Clause like the one apprehended by the Sherbert
Court in 1963, there ought to be some early conduct exemption cases.
But the Supreme Court's first square confrontation with Free Exercise
was in 1878.125 It unequivocally rejected the conduct exemp-
tion.
1 6
Maybe the Court abandoned a more generous, if not original,
understanding of Free Exercise resembling the conduct exemption.
But the "conduct exemption" exists only to the extent that there are
cases instantiating it. By that I mean, at least, judicial holdings clear-
ly stating a willingness, as a matter of Free Exercise command, to
exempt a believer from an otherwise valid and neutral law. For more
than minimum evidentiary value, I mean a holding in favor of such a
believer. That is because the conduct exemption is not a principle or
prohibition capable of constraining legislatures without judicial en-
forcement. It does not prohibit a class or kind of legislation. By defi-
nition, it operates upon generally valid laws. The Article VI "no reli-
gious Test" clause'27 is a perfect example of a prohibition on a par-
ticular class or kind of legislation. It has played a central role in the
development of religious liberty in this country, but there are no
cases relying on the clause.
128
McConnell allows that the state and federal religion clauses all
124. See id. at 1428 (discussing exemptions for citizens from laws passed by parliament).
125. Id. at 1411-15.
126. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (declining to find an exception to a
prohibition against polygamy for Mormons). But perhaps this decision stemmed from the then
undeniable prejudice against Mormons.
127. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 3.
128. See Gerard V. Bradley, The No Religious Test Clause and the Constitution of




together "did not engender many lawsuits . . . and fewer still raised
the question of free exercise exemptions.' ' 29 He opines that "[t]he
largest volume of litigation was over the competency to testify in
court of those, like Universalists, who did not believe in a future
state of rewards and punishments. There were also a number of blas-
phemy prosecutions that raised issues under the religion clauses."
130
He provides no citations, though he is probably right. I might ques-
tion one judgment: sabbatarian complaints probably equalled incom-
petency cases. McConnell does not investigate what this combined
number of cases might have to say, if not as authority directly on
point, then as windows onto the constitutional treatment of conscien-
tious objection. He lays them aside. "Since both of these categories
of cases involved laws specifically directed at religion, they did not
raise the exemption question."
131
What's this? Precisely those cases in which the injury to con-
science is most direct and most clearly due to "majoritarian oppres-
sion" (if you like) did not raise the question! McConnell puts them
aside to explore a "suggestive" argument by counsel, in the
Permoli132 case, on a point that the Supreme Court held inapposite,
because it "may" indicate that the "legal profession believed that
interference with religious activities required compelling justifica-
tion!" 133 He puts them aside even though, earlier, he counted as
evidence for his position, legislative exemptions from religious assess-
-ments that, he seems to concede, were also "religious" laws.'
34
Then they were probative of the peoples' sense of the "appropriate
remedy when law and conscience conflict."' 3 Now, apparently, they
are not. He does not note the apparent inconsistency-if exemption
from "religious" laws count, they count for both sides of the argu-
ment-or attempt to explain the flaw in the reasoning of those of us
who do.
McConnell is most vulnerable for what he does not say. Why is
the absence of federal cases not the analytical focus? Why is this not
as suggestive as an argument by counsel? It is true that, in 1833,
129. McConnell, supra note 75, at 1503.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Permoli v. Municipality No. 1, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589 (1845).
133. McConnell, supra note 75, at 1503 (emphasis added).




Barron v. Baltimore"3 6 settled that the Religion Clauses bound only
the federal government, so there should be relatively few federal deci-
sions. But why none before Reynolds in 1878? Now, recall that the
national government (that is, Congress) enjoyed plenary governmental
power in the territories' and in the District of Colombia. 138 Yet,
there were no reported challenges (much less successful ones) to
Sabbatarian regulations there. The national government also operated
courts. What of circuit decisions by Supreme Court justices
McLean 13  and Story, 4 ' holding witnesses incompetent because
they could not conscientiously swear? No conduct exemption was
found there either. There is a body of evidence here demanding the
analyst's attention.
Contrary to McConnell's assertion, the blasphemy and oath cases
did not involve "laws specifically directed at religion." 4' If they
had, courts enforcing even Locke's understanding of religious liberty
would have voided them. One might well ask McConnell, on his
interpretation of these laws, whether the religion clauses had any judi-
cially enforceable content. If not, he has just disproved his case. Ei-
ther way, one has to wonder about the coherence of his project:
courts would enforce laws "specifically directed at religion" (and thus
intentionally coerce belief), but not laws that pursued secular goals
incidentally burdening belief.
McConnell certainly is mistaken, as a historical matter, on the
point of blasphemy and oath cases. The oath requirement was "di-
rected" at securing truthful testimony.42 Since prosecution for perju-
ry was rare, witness belief in a greater than human sanction for lying
was thought essential to truthful testimony: the incompetent witness
thus suffered no diminution of religious freedom. A New York court
stated the common view:
Religion is a subject on which every man has a right to think ac-
cording to the dictates of his understanding. It is a solemn concern
between his conscience and his God, with which no human tribunal
has a right to meddle. But in the development of facts, and the
136. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
137. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
138. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
139. United States v. Kennedy, 26 F. Cas. 761 (C.C.D. I1. 1843) (No. 15,524).
140. Wakefield v. Ross, 28 F. Cas. 1346 (C.C.D. R.I. 1827) (No. 17,050).
141. McConnell, supra note 75, at 1503.
142. But see id. at 1467 (asserting that the principle means of ensuring honest testimony
was through the oath requirement).
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ascertainment of truth, human tribunals have a right to interfere.
They are bound to see that no man's rights are impaired or taken
away, but through the medium of testimony entitled to belief; and
no testimony is entitled to credit, unless delivered under the solem-
nity of an oath, which comes home to the conscience of the wit-
ness, and will create a tie arising from his belief that false swearing
would expose him to punishment in the life to come. On this great
principle rest all our institutions, and especially the distribution of
justice between man and man.
143
No doubt this account reflects a particular conception of God
and His working in human affairs (and of human nature, the relative
importance of justice between individuals, and of religion in the life
of the nation, and much else). But the point of the oath requirement
was not to subordinate unpopular religions or to promote majoritarian
prejudices. The lesson for us is that Americans then considered the
oath requirement a "general" or "neutral law"-at least not one "di-
rected at religion"-and no conduct exemption for conscientious ob-
jectors was constitutionally required. Legislation permitted some be-
lievers to affirm rather than to swear, but that further suggests that
"judicial review" did not transform preconstitutional practice. Besides,
McConnell can hardly object that, when a particular conception of the
Sovereign Almighty (for lack of a better term) influences legal doc-
trine, cases construing the doctrine are irrelevant to his inquiry. He
justifies the conduct exemption with one himself!1
44
Blasphemy prosecutions were not understood then to be "specifi-
cally directed at religion" either. I have found four lengthy antebel-
lum appellate opinions upholding blasphemy convictions. They are Com-
monwealth v. Kneeland,45  State v. Chandler,146  People v.
Ruggles,'47 and Updegraph v. Commonwealth.148 Mr. Updegraph
pronounced "that the Holy Scriptures were a mere fable," and so in-
formed his fellow citizens. 49 Messrs. Ruggles' 50 and Chandler ex-
pressed, in locker room language, the upshot of Unitarians' denial of
143. Jackson v. Gridley, 18 Johns. 98, 106 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1820).
144. See McConnell, supra note 9, at 1152.
145. 37 Mass. (20 Pick.) 206 (1838).
146. 2 Del. (2 Harr.) 553 (1837).
147. 8 Johns. 290 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811).
148. 11 Serg. & Rawle 394 (Pa. 1824).
149. Id. at 398.
150. Ruggles, 8 Johns. at 292.
1991]
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW
Jesus' divinity.' If Jesus was not the Son of God, what with bibli-
cal reports that Mary was with child at an embarrassingly early point
in her betrothal to Joseph, then "Jesus Christ was a bastard and his
mother [the Virgin Mary] was a whore."' 52 Mr. Kneeland, an
avowed pantheist, published some unfavorable evaluations of Univer-
salist beliefs.'53 In so doing, he "willfully" denied God's existence
and his government of the universe, in violation of a 1782 Massachu-
setts statute.
54
All the blasphemers cited state constitutionally guaranteed rights
of conscience. 5 5 In each case there was, we might say, a burden on
conscience in their defense. Each court said that there was no consti-
tutional issue at all. The court in Chandler expressly incorporated the
reasoning of Updegraph,56 and, in substance, the reasoning of
Ruggles. Kneeland, the latest, relied upon Ruggles,15 7 but the court
was apparently unaware of Chandler and Updegraph. Chandler is
representative of all four in the following relevant particulars.
The Chandler court emphasized that the prosecution was not
directed at the spiritual reform of the speaker. Prosecution did not
presume, recognize, or enforce the truth of any religious proposition.
To suggest otherwise confused blasphemy with heresy. All the courts
agreed that anyone might believe, profess, and argue for, orally or in
writing, any religious position at all.
[I]t is the open, public vilification of the religion of the country that
is punished, not to force conscience by punishment, but to preserve
the peace of the country, by an outward respect to the religion of
the country, and not as a restraint upon the liberty of conscience;
but licentiousness endangering the public peace .... 158
As the Chandler court reported, "[i]n general, an offence which
outrages the feelings of the community so far as to endanger the
public peace, may be prohibited by the legislature .... , Chris-
151. Chandler, 2 Del. (2 Harr.) at 554.
152. Id.
153. Kneeland, 37 Mass. (20 Pick.) at 207.
154. Id. at 207-08.
155. See, e.g., id. at 219.
156. Chandler, 2 Del. (2 Harr.) at 577-78.
157. Kneeland, 37 Mass. (20 Pick.) at 218.
158. Chandler, 2 Del. (2 Harr.) at 577-78 (quoting Updegraph, 11 Serg. & Rawle at 407
(emphasis omitted)).
159. Id. at 553. Note that, in Updegraph, Chandler, and Kneeland, the defendants com-
mitted statutory offenses; in Ritggles, the defendant was indicted at common law.
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tianity, for the time being, was the religion preferred by the vast bulk
of the people and, therefore, reviling it was subject to indictment,
though reviling Mohammed was not. So opined the Chandler
court.1
60
It may be that McConnell thinks these cases better viewed as
"directed at religion," but then he is not engaging in historical recov-
ery. To the extent that the cases are "directed at religion," their sig-
nificance cuts deeply into McConnell's case. Precisely in order to
maintain a complete freedom of religion, "[a]ll men, of conscientious
religious feeling, ought to concede outward respect to every mode of
religious worship."' 61 Freedom of religion thus entailed duties for
individuals to refrain from actions that they otherwise possessed a
natural right to perform.
Even after relegating Updegraph, McConnell is left with several
unfavorable antebellum holdings of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court.162 They are unfavorable because they (more or less explicit-
ly) treat what we would call a conduct exemption claim as presenting
no justiciable issue of religious liberty at all. Pennsylvania was, by all
accounts, among the two or three most liberal colonies (and later,
states) on the subject of religious liberty. If the conduct exemption
did not fly there, we should not expect it to fly anywhere else.
McConnell tries to finesse these precedents by trotting out his
workhorse "judicial review." He proceeds to compound the confusion
surrounding its earlier labors by distorting Judge John Gibson's views
on that subject and on conduct exemptions.' 63 McConnell then
courts terminal obscurity by critically contrasting this mass with the
assertedly more typical and influential positions of Madison (on con-
duct exemptions) and John Marshall (on judicial review). The cash
value of this confusing transaction is that McConnell can afford to
relegate analytically the Pennsylvania corpus, even though it compris-
es a majority of all the cases he discusses! How? By identifying
those cases with Gibson's "idiosyncratic" views that, besides their
quirkiness, are squarely at odds with the authoritative opinions of
Madison and Marshall. Lengthy excerpts from the key passages ap-
pear in the notes, lest this summary obscure or distort McConnell's strategy
164
160. See id. at 571. I doubt that the Kneeland court would have followed Chandler here.
161. Updegraph, 11 Serg. & Rawle at 405.
162. For McConnell's treatment of the Pennsylvania corpus, see McConnell, Religion,
supra note 75, at 1506-10.
163. Id. at 1507.
164. Id. at 1507-10.
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How does McConnell execute this desperate plan? He starts with
Commonwealth v. Wolf,'65 an 1817 challenge by a Jewish merchant
to a Sabbatarian prohibition on Sunday commerce. Mr. Wolf lost, but
McConnell sees hope in the defeat. Wolf lost "on grounds that would
admit the principle of free exercise exemptions."' McConnell next
The next two Pennsylvania cases, [after Commonwealth v. Wolf, 3 Serg. & Rawle
48 (Pa. 1817)] Commonwealth v. Lesher and Simon's Executors v. Gratz, both
contain opinions by Chief Justice John Bannister Gibson, a highly regarded jurist
who is best known today for his dissenting opinion in Eakin v. Raub, in which he
rebutted Chief Justice Marshall's position in Marbury that the judiciary has authori-
ty to declare void unconstitutional acts of the legislature. Gibson also was the fore-
most judicial opponent of free exercise exemptions in the nineteenth century. His
decision in Simon's Executors was the leading precedent in the thirteen original
states prior to the Civil War for the proposition that free exercise does not include
the right of exemption from generally applicable law. An examination of Gibson's
opinions in Lesher and Simon's Executors shows that his rejection of constitutional
judicial review and his position on free exercise exemptions were closely related.
In Simon's Executors, Gibson explained the theoretical basis for his position.
"Rightly considered," he said, "there are no duties half so sacred as those which
the citizen owes to the laws." "That every other obligation shall yield to that of
the laws, as to a superior moral force," he wrote, "is a tacit condition of member-
ship in every society, whether lay or secular, temporal or spiritual, because no
citizen can lawfully hold communion with those who have associated on any other
terms." Gibson's statement may be contrasted with Madison's position in the Me-
morial and Remonstrance. Madison contended that religious duty "is precedent both
in order of time and degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil Society." Gibson
held that a person entering into civil society must assume the obligation of
yielding to all the laws, because no other form of association is possible. Madison
held that "every man" who becomes a member of a civil society "must always do
it with a reservation . . . of his allegiance to the Universal Sovereign." What Gib-
son said is impossible, Madison said is necessary. Gibson's view of the nature of
religious freedom thus conflicts directly with that of one of the leading framers of
the federal free exercise clause.
Gibson's rejection of the principle of judicial review, as explained in Eakin
v. Raub, provides further reason to doubt that he represented the prevailing view
on the interpretation of free exercise. Like Locke, Gibson believed in legislative
supremacy. In Lesher, he attributed his conclusion to his "horror of judicial legisla-
tion" and said that he "would suffer any extremity of inconvenience, rather than
step beyond the legitimate province of the court." As discussed above, the advent
of judicial review had transformed a principle of free exercise previously enforced
solely through legislative action into one enforceable through the courts. Since
virtually all of the framers and ratifiers of the first amendment expected and in-
tended their work to be judicially enforceable, Gibson's contrary position was al-
most surely idiosyncratic.
Id. (citations onitted).
165. 3 Serg. & Rawle 48 (Pa. 1817).
166, McConnell, supra note 75, at 1506.
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introduces Gibson's dissent in Commonwealth v. Lesher,'67 a case
involving the challenge for cause of a prospective juror who could
not conscientiously convict in a capital case. The Lesher court said
that such scruples made the prospective juror prejudiced and unfit to
judge the case.'68 The majority insisted that the matter was entirely
one of common law.169 It did not offer an account of the constitu-
tional guarantees.
Gibson, dissenting, did. 170 Quite debatably, he said that the ma-
jority implicitly elevated conscience over the requirements of the
orderly administration of justice.'7 ' Gibson asked rhetorically, what
are the rights of conscience that the Pennsylvania courts placed be-
yond interference by human authority?
172
Simply a right to worship the Supreme Being according to the dic-
tates of the heart; to adopt any creed or hold any opinion whatever
on the subject of religion; and to do, or forbear to do, any act, for
conscience sake, the doing or forbearing of which, is not prejudicial
to the public weal.
173
Four years later, Gibson authored the opinion of a unanimous
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Philips v. Gratz.74 A Jewish plain-
tiff was nonsuited for failing to appear for a Saturday trial. 175 Ex-
pressing regret that the trial, apparently for important reasons, was
scheduled for the Jewish Sabbath, Gibson rejected a "continuance" for
conscience's sake when claimed as a "right."'176 He referred readers
to his Lesher dissent.177 This reference connotes concurrence of the
other judges in Gibson's earlier account of constitutionally guaranteed
religious liberty. To avoid such unfavorable implications, McConnell
introduces Gibson's 1825 "rejection of [the] principle of judicial re-
view" in Eakin v. Raub.178 He also asserts a sharp contrast between
Gibson on religious liberty in Gratz, and Madison in his Memorial
167. 17 Serg. & Rawle 155 (Pa. 1828).
168. Id. at 160.
169. Id. at 156.
170. See id. at 160-61 (Gibson, C.J., dissenting).
171. -Where liberty of conscience would impinge on the paramount right of the public, it
ought to be restrained." Id. at 160.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. 2 Pen. & W. 412 (Pa. 1831).
175. Id. at 412.
176. Id. at 416.
177. Id. at 417.
178. 12 Serg. & Rawle 330, 344-58 (Pa. 1825).
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and Remonstrance.'79 Gibson's rejection of judicial review made
him "idiosyncratic," s° and his view of religious freedom "conflicts
directly"' s ' with one of the leading sponsors of the federal free ex-
ercise clause. Thus Wolf, Lesher, and Gratz, do not count heavily
against McConnell's defense of conduct exemptions.
McConnell leaves Pennsylvania with notice' 2 of Specht v.
Commonwealth,'83 another Sabbatarian case, from 1848. Mr. Specht
lost, and the court cited184 Gibson's opinions in Lesher and Gratz.
(Gibson was Chief Justice at the time, and silently joined the opinion
by Judge Bell.) A lengthy excerpt from Specht appears below.8 5
The reader is invited to evaluate McConnell's optimistic account of
the case: "Toward the end of the opinion, however, the court ap-
peared to reject the claim on the facts, much as it had in Wolf ....
Thus, having restated the no-exemptions precedent, the court nar-
rowed its holding to the facts of the case, leaving open the possibility
that an exemption might be granted when an actual conflict
arose."
186
I submit that McConnell's interpretation of Specht is fanciful, as
is his interpretation of Wolf. In any event, here are a few of the ma-
jor flaws in his strategy. First, the major premise is wrong; Gibson
did not reject "judicial review" in Eakin. He rebutted persuasively
most prevailing arguments for it, including Marshall's in Marbury.
But Gibson embraced judicial review in various contexts and to vary-
ing extents: (a) of state laws against the Federal Constitution8 7
(Gibson believed the Supremacy Clause required no less.' 8
McConnell relegates this huge qualification to a footnote); 89 (b) to
the extent necessary to assure that enactment was procedurally val-
id; 190 and (c) where the judiciary was the addressee of the constitu-
tional command.' 9' This last category includes, but is not limited to,
179. See supra note 164.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. McConnell, supra note 75, at 1510.
183. 8 Pa. 312 (Pa. 1848).
184. Id. at 322-23.
185. See infra notes 263-67 and accompanying text.
186. McConnell, supra note 75, at 1510.
187. See Eakin, 12 Serg. & Rawle at 355-57 (Gibson, CJ., dissenting).
188. Id.
189. McConnell, supra note 75, at 1507 n.51 1.
190, See Eakin, 12 Serg. & Rawle at 347-48 (Gibson, C.J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 352.
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the "defensive" judicial review of Marbury itself. Gibson's Eakin
opinion is consistent with one reasonable interpretation of Marbury,
one that sees judicial review as a barrier to legislative attempts to
alter its-the judiciary's-constitutionally assigned power. This pre-
sumes a fairly crisp separation of powers that works against broader
judicial review of other branches' actions.
The second flaw in McConnell's reasoning is that Gibson did
not believe in "legislative supremacy," as McConnell alleges.'"2 He
is, therefore, not easily isolated from his contemporaries as some
ante-Constitution dinosaur. Besides the judicially enforceable limits
upon legislatures just noted, Gibson insisted throughout his Eakin
opinion that the legislature and the judiciary are both subordinate to
the people. 9 3 Popular sovereignty is the basis of Gibson's restrained
account of judicial review. His commitment to it translated into sub-
stantial (though hardly complete or idiosyncratic) deference to leg-
islation, in the absence of contrary direction from the people via
reasonably explicit constitutional direction. In this, Gibson typified
his generation.
Finally, even if we assume (with McConnell) that Gibson reject-
ed "judicial review," it does not aid McConnell's argument for sever-
al reasons. First, Gibson dissented in Eakin; the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court did not reject judicial review. Its rulings in the cases
that McConnell discusses could not, therefore, depend upon Gibson's
assertedly "idiosyncratic views." Second, Gibson joined the Court in
Wolf and Specht. McConnell thus cannot be right about both of the
following propositions: that Gibson was the foremost, but still "idio-
syncratic," opponent of exemptions, and his (McConnell's) optimistic
interpretations of Wolf and Specht (that they implicitly, if incomplete-
ly, endorse conduct exemptions). If the latter is sound, Gibson was
not such a bad guy after all; if the former is sound, then the rosy
glosses are false. Finally, Specht (which Gibson joined) occurred three
years after Gibson disavowed his Eakin dissent and (as the story
develops in McConnell's piece) adopted "judicial review." In 1845
(three years before Wol), Gibson concluded that his opposition in
Eakin to wide-ranging judicial review was no longer tenable.'9
g
Wider judicial review had been legitimized by "necessity," and indi-
rectly ratified by the people, who seemed to Gibson uninterested in
192. McCoimell, supra note 75, at 1509-10.
193. See Eakin, 12 Serg. & Rawle at 330.
194. Norris v. Clymer, 2 Pa. 277, 281 (1845).
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their duty to enforce constitutional restraints.'95 Specht cannot be at-
tributed to hostility toward judicial review on anyone's part, and
Specht rejects conduct exemptions.
Unless we are to treat the entire antebellum Pennsylvania court
and all its decisions as idiosyncratic, we must reject McConnell's
ingenious efforts to escape them. Note that, to get this far,
McConnell not only ignored Updegraph, but also blew past the 1792
case of Stansbury v. Marks. 96 In Marks, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court fined a Jewish witness who refused to testify on Saturday.
197
According to McConnell, Marks is the only case in the first twenty
years after ratification, but it is "cryptic."' 98 In my view, Marks
may be briefly noted, but it is hardly "cryptic." Its import is clear
enough.
McConnell asserts, without argument or citation to authority, that
"Gibson also was the foremost judicial opponent of free exercise
exemptions in the nineteenth century.'" He also asserts, without
argument or citation to authority, that Gratz was the leading antebel-
lum precedent for that opposition."°° Neither assertion, based upon
my acquaintance with the materials, is warranted.
The contrast between Madison and Gibson is almost as miscon-
ceived. Certainly, McConnell adduces no genuine disagreement be-
tween them. Madison was speaking in Memorial and Remonstrance
of first principles that should inform a decision about the constitution-
al order. That is practically what the General Assessments2 ' and
Jefferson's Bill for Religious Freedom2 2 were about. Gibson spoke
as an actor within one institution, operating under an established writ-
ten Constitution. His opinion in Eakin relied heavily upon the precise
terms of the constitutional enactment and upon the nature of legal
reasoning and adjudication. It is true that comments in his Lesher dis-
sent sound much like the Lockean social contract position McConnell
criticizes, the position that McConnell deploys Madison to neutralize.
195. Id.
196. 2 Dall. 213 (Pa. 1792).
197. Id.
198. McConnell, supra note 75, at 1504.
199. Id. at 1507.
200. Id.
201. See, e.g., Petition for General Assessment (Nov. 4, 1784), reprinted in CHARLES
FENTON JAMES, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR RELIGIOUS LBERTY IN ViR-
GINIA 125 (1971).
202. 1 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 544-50 (J. Boyd ed., 1950).
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In Philips v. Gratz, Gibson added that, "[r]ightly considered, there are
no duties half so sacred as those which the citizen owes to the
laws." 23 But "rightly considered," to put it mildly, is a pregnant
modifier. Gibson expands briefly in Gratz, but says too little to per-
mit comparison with the more developed views of James Madison.
Gibson's reliance in Lesher on institutional considerations is
worth additional notice. In Lesher, Gibson wrote that "no one, is
more thoroughly convinced of ... the abstract propriety of the objec-
tion to the juror here., '2' 4 But, as McConnell says, for Gibson, the
remedy lay with the legislature. That is, as a matter of political mo-
rality, Gibson appears to have favored accommodation, but it was not
for courts to translate that extralegal opinion into enforceable law.
McConnell cites no evidence (and I am aware of none) that Madison,
who survived until 1836, ever criticized Gibson or supported conduct
exemptions. In fact, McConnell says only that Madison's Memorial
and Remonstrance suggests an account of religious liberty "conso-
nant" with exemptions.2" Gibson's views are also consonant with
exemptions, as long as (Gibson would say) the judge is authorized by
enactment (or, perhaps, operating free of constraint when, for in-
stance, scheduling trials) to act upon his own view of the situation.
McConnell's decision to equate the authoritative Madison with
Memorial and Remonstrance is questionable. Memorial and Remon-
strance was a compendious, incoherent public circular with a quite
limited impact even upon the Virginia Assessment controversy. 0 6
Why not treat The Federalist Nos. 10 and 51 as "Madison" for pur-
poses of unfavorable comparison to Gibson? Probably because then
the comparison would be less unfavorable. If we took President
Madison's 1811 veto of a bill for incorporating an Episcopal church
in Alexander, °7 the contrast with Gibson would disappear altogeth-
203. Philips v. Gratz, 2 Pen. & W. 412, 416 (Pa. 1831).
204. 17 Serg. & Rawle at 163.
205. McConnell, supra note 75, at 1453.
206. See BRADLEY, supra note 90, at 38-40.
207. The opponents of the bill state that:
Because the bill exceeds the rightful authority to which governments are limited by
the essential distinction between civil and religious functions, and violates, in par-
ticular, the article of the Constitution of the United States, which declares that
-Congress shall make no law respecting a religious establishment." The bill enacts
into and establishes by law sundry rules and proceedings relative purely to the
organization and polity of the church incorporated and comprehending even the
election and removal of a minister of the same; so that no change could be made
therein by the particular society, or by the general Church, of which it is a mem-
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er. Moreover, Madison would be idiosyncratic. I know of no other
antebellum figure who thought church incorporation, as such, uncon-
stitutional.
There may have been some philosophical disagreement between
Gibson and Madison. I do not know enough about Gibson to say.
But McConnell has adduced none. Besides, the matter is not between
Gibson and Madison, but between Gibson and the ratifiers' apprehen-
sions of Free Exercise. As mentioned at the outset, that simply is not
reducible to Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance, especially since
Madison never suggested it as an interpretation of the Constitution's
Free Exercise Clause.
Besides McConnell's extensive discussion of People v. Phil-
lips,2" 8 he identifies just two other antebellum exemption deci-
sions-Commonwealth v. Drake 9  and State v. Wilson.2 '0  Both
cases reject conduct exemptions for religiously motivated conduct. In
both, McConnell finds a silver lining where there is none. He says
that "it is noteworthy [in Drake] that the prosecution confined its
arguments to the facts and did not contest the defendant's interpreta-
tion of constitutional principles. 21' McConnell suggests acquies-
cence by the prosecution in the "constitutional principle" of "rights of
conscience." But the prosecution argued the law, and the facts seem
to have been undisputed. From the report relied upon by McConnell,
ber, and whose authority it recognizes. This particular church, therefore, would so
far be a religious establishment by law: a legal force and sanction being given to
certain articles in its constitution and administration. Nor can it be considered that
the articles thus established are to be taken as the descriptive criteria only of the
corporate identity of the society; inasmuch as this identity must depend on other
characteristics; as the regulations established are generally unessential and alterable,
according to the principles and canons by which churches of that denomination
govern themselves; and, as the injunctions and prohibitions contained in the regula-
tions would be enforced by the penal consequences applicable to a violation of
them according to the local law.
Because the bill vests in the said incorporated church an authority to pro-
vide for the support of the poor, and the education of poor children of the same;
an authority which, being altogether superfluous if the provision is to be the result
of pious charity, would be a precedent for giving to religious societies, as such, a
legal agency in carrying into effect a public and civil duty.
11 ANNALS OF CoNo. 351 (1811).
208. (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1813), text printed in Privileged Communications to Clergymen,
I CATH. LAW. 199-209 (1955) [hereinafter Privileged Communications]. See McConnell, supra
note 75, at 1504-05.
209. 15 Mass. 161 (1818). See McConnell, supra note 75, at 1506.
210. 13 S.C.L. (2 McCord) 393 (1823). See McConnell, supra note 75, at 1510-11.
211. McConnell, supra note 75, at 1506.
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it is reasonably clear that the prosecutor agreed that a provision of
the declaration of rights was in play-the privilege against self in-
crimination, not the right of conscience.2 2
McConnell's handling of Wilson is both less and more troubling
than his treatment of Drake. He faithfully relates language from Wil-
son2 t3 that makes Scalia's opinion in Smith sound libertarian In
other words, Wilson sounds like Reynolds v. United States.
McConnell then effects damage control with some very troubling
rejoinders. For example, he criticizes Wilson's reasoning with the
contemporary and familiar view, one that appeals to readers of his
article, that Wilson, like Smith, is implicitly biased against minority
religious practices.214 But appeal to present sensibilities has no place
in the enterprise in which McConnell is at least ostensibly engaged:
scholarly recovery of historical authority as a way to arbitrate among
present sensibilities.
McConnell leaves aside, in addition to the blasphemy and wit-
ness incompetency cases, one of the most formidable Sabbatarian dis-
cussions of the antebellum era, City Council v. Benjamin,21 5 and the
municipal court opinion from 1833 appended to it.216 Neither sup-
ports McConnell's view. Each rejects conduct exemptions. Since their
reasoning is substantially captured by Specht (of which a lengthy
excerpt follows), further comment on them will be omitted.
McConnell omits opinions of various courts21 7 (including the
United States Supreme Court) exploring conscientious objection to
laws requiring, in one way or another, financial support of religious
institutions. Most likely McConnell regards these as further examples
of "laws directed at religion." My earlier objection to his relegation
of the blasphemy cases is renewable: when it suits his polemical
purposes, he thinks "general assessment" laws quite appropriate.
Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance against them is probably the
most significant piece of evidence in his argument. If so, the opinion
212. See Drake, 15 Mass. at 161-62.
213. McConnell, supra note 75, at 1510-11.
214. Id. at 1511.
215. 32 S.C.L. (2 Strob.) 508 (1846).
216. Town Council v. Duke, (S.C. 1833), reprinted in 32 S.C.L. (2 Strob.) 508, 531
(1846).
217. See, e.g., Holbrook v. Holbrook, 18 Mass. 248 (1822); Adams v. Howe, 14 Mass.
340 (1817); Barnes v. Inhabitants of the First Parish, 6 Mass. 401 (1810); Muzzy v. Wilkins,
I Smith I (N.H. 1803).
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of a unanimous United States Supreme Court in Terrett v. Taylor218
is relevant. (McConnell does not mention it.) Terrett involved distri-
bution of Episcopal glebe lands and construed the free exercise clause
of the Virginia Declaration of Rights.2 19 Besides that, John Marshall
joined the opinion. His views, at least on judicial review, are central-
ly deployed in McConnell's argument.
Terrett, written by Justice Story, held that the legislature
could not create or continue a religious establishment which should
have exclusive rights and prerogatives, or compel the citizens to
worship under a stipulated form or discipline, or to pay taxes to
those whose creed they could not conscientiously believe. But the
free exercise of religion cannot be justly deemed to be restrained by
aiding with equal attention the votaries of every sect to perform
their own religious duties, or by establishing funds for the support
of ministers, for public charities, for the endowment of churches, or
for the sepultur of the dead.220
McConnell does not discuss other matters that a sound historical
analysis would not neglect. Without explanation, he evidently221
closes his investigation at 1848 with mention of Specht. Such deci-
sions are always a bit arbitrary, but it seems to me that his reasons
for not engaging the entire antebellum corpus ought be shared. We
know that the Civil War is a turning point in our constitutional tradi-
tion, and it would be helpful to see how the great Irish and German
Catholic immigrations of the late 1840s affected interpretation of Free
Exercise. So, extending the inquiry would have uncovered the only
antebellum invalidation of a Sabbatrian law, Ex parte Newman,222
an 1858 California case that was reversed three years later in Ex
parte Andrews. 223 Extending the inquiry would also have uncovered
the typically unsympathetic judicial response to Roman Catholic pleas
for relief from Bible reading in public schools.224 For that matter,
some explanation for Reynolds is reasonably expected after the con-
duct exemption allegedly enjoyed such support in the antebellum cor-
218. 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43 (1815).
219. Id. at 45-49.
220. Id. at 49.
221. He states that -It]he only other religious exemption decision located front this period
is State v. Wilson .... "McConnell, supra note 75, at 1510 (emphasis addded). Specht is
the latest case noted, and seems to function as a boundary marker.
222, 9 Cal. 502 (1858).
223. 18 Cal. 678 (1861).




Within his chronological borders, McConnell neglects powerful
relevant evidence from a plentiful group of church property dis-
putes,225 especially those involving Roman Catholic parishes.226
One of them is from Pennsylvania, and includes a long opinion by
Gibson.227 The more numerous group of Protestant cases reinforces
the emerging conclusion of this analysis, that "religious liberty" then
consisted of "neutrality of reasons," and that this constraint extended
(at least practically) not to individuals' religiously motivated conduct,
but to church doctrine, discipline, and worship. This freedom, was, as
claimed, all but "perfect" in this sense: the government disability
correlated exactly with the differentiating features of the Protestant
churches that composed the vast mass of religious groupings.
This excerpt from an 1871 Illinois Supreme Court opinion exem-
plifies judicial resolution of Protestant church property disputes:
Our constitution provides, that "the free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship, without discrimination, shall forev-
er be guaranteed." In ecclesiastical law, profession means the act of
entering into a religious order. Religious worship consists in the
performance of all the external acts, and the observance of all ordi-
nances and ceremonies, which are engaged in with the sole and
avowed object of honoring God. The constitution intended to guar-
antee, from all interference by the State, not only each man's reli-
gious faith, but his membership in the church, and the rites and
discipline which might be adopted. The only exception to uncon-
trolled liberty is, that acts of licentiousness shall not be excused,
and practices inconsistent with the peace and safety of the State,
shall not be justified. Freedom of religious profession and worship
can not be maintained, if the civil courts trench upon the domain of
the church, construe its canons and rules, dictate its discipline, and
225. See, e.g., Gibson v. Armstrong, 46 Ky. (7 B. Mon.) 481 (1847); Den v. Bolton, 12
NJ.L. 206 (1831); Robertson v. Bullions, 11 N.Y. 243 (1834); Presbyterian Congregation v.
Johnston, 1 Watt & Serg. 9 (Pa. 1841) (Gibson, J.); Harmon v. Dreher, 17 S.C. Eq. (Speers
Eq.) 87 (1843).
226. See, e.g., Wardens of the Church of St. Louis v. Blanc, 8 Rob. 51 (La. 1844);
Saint Francis Church v. Martin, 4 Rob. 62 (La. 1843); Smith v. Bonhoof, 2 Mich. 116
(1851); In re St. Mary's Church, 7 Serg. & Rawle 516 (Pa. 1822) (Gibson, J.); see also
PATRICK J. DIGNAN, A HISTORY OF THE LEGAL INCORPORATION OF CATHOLIC CHURCH
PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 1784-1932, 46-213 (1933).
227. In re St. Mary's Church, 7 Serg. & Rawle 516 (Pa. 1822). For background of this
litigation, see FRANCIS E. TOURSCHER, THe HOGAN SCHISM AND TRUSTEE TROUBLES IN ST.
MARY'S CHURCH; PHILADELPHIA, 1820-1829 (1930).
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regulate its trials.28
Of course, 1871 is important for the church property pronounce-
ment of a more authoritative bench, the United States Supreme Court.
Watson v. Jones2 9 expressly subordinated the freedom of churches
to "the law of morality," even as it affirmed the centrality of that
freedom to the, by then, eighty-year experience of religious liber-
ty.
230
The Roman Catholic property cases are more instructive. They
present a compelling scenario for the conduct exemption; compelling
enough to submit that, if none surfaces here, there is likely none at
all. The legal disputes grew out of parish schisms-cleric/hierarchy
versus lay/cleric splits, frequently abetted and sometimes produced by
ethnic tensions among French, German, and Irish Catholics. The con-
stitutional and legal issues centered around state laws governing
church incorporation. They coincided with the needs of the over-
whelming number of churches. These enabling statutes followed the
universal practice of Reformed Protestant churches, and vested control
of temporalities in lay-dominated boards of trustees.23' This mix of
ingredients was brought to a boil in -1829, when American bishops in
provincial council decreed:
Whereas, lay trustees have frequently abused the rights granted to
them by civil authority, to the great detriment of religion and scan-
dal of the faithful, we most earnestly desire that in future, no
church be erected or consecrated unless it be assigned by a written
instrument to the Bishop in whose diocese it is to be erected, for
divine worship and use of the faithful, whenever it can be done.232
Approved by the Pope in 1830,233 the result, without a statute
authorizing formation of a corporation sole, was stated by the Michi-
gan Supreme Court in 1851: "[I]t is clear that when the control of
the church edifice is . . . placed in the hands of laymen, it ceases
from that instant to be a Roman Catholic Church. 234 Could it be
that "the Legislature of this State intended to vest in lay trustees, a
power which would close the doors of every Catholic church in the
228. Chase v. Cheney, 58 Ill. 509, 537 (1871).
229. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
230. Id. at 728.
231. See generally DIoriNA, supra note 226, at 66.
232. Smith v. Bonhoof, 2 Mich. 116, 122 (1851) (quoting the first Provincial Council).
233. Id.
234. Id. at 126.
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State?, 235 The Court held that it was not.2 36 The legislature, in a
country that constitutionally protects religious liberty, could not have
intended such a result. But the judicial solution was not to craft con-
stitutionally compelled exemptions from the statute. It was to interpret
the statute as accommodating Roman Catholic discipline. Throughout
the entire antebellum era (during which Roman Catholic congrega-
tions struggled against the "Protestant" corporation laws), no single
instance of judicial exemption is recorded.237 Even the Michigan
Supreme Court, which strove to accommodate Catholics, wrote in the
same opinion that "[t]he allegiance which a Roman Catholic owes to
the spiritual head of his church, rightly understood, in no way con-
flicts with that allegiance which he owes to the constitution and laws
prescribed by the civil government of which he is a citizen. Should
any conflict arise, the former must yield."238 Sounds like Judge
Gibson.
Instead of these episodes,2 39 McConnell comments at length up-
on People v. Phillips.240  Phillips at least involved a Catholic
priest.241 Father Anthony Kohlmann, a learned German Jesuit, was
summoned to give evidence in Mayor DeWitt Clinton's court in a
theft-related trial. 242 Father Kohlmann had evidently heard the in-
criminating confession of the accused. Under pain of ecclesiastical
discipline and possible eternal damnation, the Jesuit pulled on the veil
of sacramental secrecy.243 Over the district attorney's objection, the
court declined to sanction him for refusing to divulge. 2" Judge
Clinton relied in part upon the New York Constitution's Free Exer-
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. See supra note 226; see also Robert F. McNamara, Trusteeisin in the Atlantic
States, 1785-1863, 30 CATH. HisT. REv. 135 (1944); Alfred F. Stritch, Trusteelsin in the Old
Northwest, 30 CATH. HIST. REv. 155 (1944).
238. Smith, 2 Mich. at 128-29.
239. McConnell mentions Permoli v. Municipality No. 1, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589 (1845),
for its suggestive argument by counsel. Pernzoli was one episode in the running law/cleric
disputes, mostly over church property rented by the Louisiana Catholic church for decades.
See DIGNAN, supra note 226, at 176. McConnell does not mention this background.
240. (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1813), text printed in Privileged Communications, supra note
208, at 200-09. For additional background on Phillips, see JOHN GILARY SHEA, A HISTORY
OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 165-67 (1890).








McConnell's handling of Phillips is as arbitrary as his treatment
of the Pennsylvania cases. Perhaps most arbitrary is his decision to
discuss Phillips at all, much more to feature it. Its precedential value
was nil. Decided by a municipal trial court (even if presided over by
a major political figure), distinguished and limited by the same court
just four years later,246 mooted and surpassed by legislation some
one and one half decades after that,247 it was singled out for repu-
diation by Gibson in Philips v. Gratz.2 48 There is certainly no justi-
fication for devoting it several pages to it, particularly when
Stansbury v. Marks 49 gets a couple of sentences. Besides that, and
first, the constitutional observations in Phillips are at most one of two
independent grounds for the holding. At least, they are observations
in support of common law reasoning. The issue in Phillips was testi-
monial privilege, and privileges may be extended by common law
courts without recourse to the Constitution. Here, the doctrines of the
Catholic Church governing auricular confession supplied one horn of
the dilemma to which privilege was an escape. In this aspect, Phillips
is like our Jehovah's Witness right-to-die hypothetical-a rule of law
that implicitly depends upon the particular religious convictions of
persons subject to it.250 Second, Phillips is not a conduct exemption
case. No statute (neutral or otherwise) was present from which ex-
emption could be sought. (Note that Fr. Kohlmann dutifully respond-
ed to subpoena, recognized the authority of the court, and was willing
to testify about matters other than confessional conversation.) In light
of the legislative guardianship of the common good exhibited in
Specht v. Commonwealth,251 for example, the absence of legislation
is crucial. Third, Judge Clinton remained within the orbit of "wor-
ship" (widely construed) as the defining feature of free exercise eligi-
bility, as his use of "ordinances," "ceremonies," and "sacraments"
attests. Testifying was no sacrament. Clinton cited the eternal secrecy
of the priest as an essential aspect of the sacrament; penetrating the
wall of confidentiality would annihilate the sacrament itself. Phillips
245. Id. at 206.
246. See People v. Smith (N.Y. Ct. Oyer & Terminer 1817), text printed in Privileged
Communications, supra note 208, at 209-13.
247. See id. at 213.
248. 2 Pen. & W. 412, 417 (Pa. 1831).
249. 2 DalI. 213 (Pa. 1792).
250. See supra p. 263.
251. 8 Pa. 312 (1848).
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is, therefore, no precedent for the more expansive "religiously moti-
vated conduct" of Sherbert v. Verner252 et al.
Fourth, Clinton affirmed that a broadly defined public or-
der-similar to that in blasphemy cases-may justify regulation of
eligible conduct like worship. He predicted, in Phillips, that against a
sect "violat[ing] the decencies of life" by, for example, "practicing
their religious rites, in a state of nakedness," or by polygamy or hu-
man sacrifice, "the hand of the magistrate would be rightfully raised
to chastise the guilty agents." '253 The New York Constitution that he
expounded distinguished "licentiousness" from "religious liberty." 254
Clinton does not say that only the truth status of religious views is
denied to legislators, but that is the practical effect of this part of the
holding. Fifth, Clinton accomplished all this with the aid of a strate-
gically placed ellipsis overlooked by McConnell. The constitutional
provision, as cited by Clinton in Phillips, prefaced its operative por-
tion with: "[a]nd whereas we are required by the benevolent princi-
ples of rational liberty, not only to expel civil tyranny, but also to
guard against that spiritual oppression and intolerance, wherewith the
bigotry and ambition of weak and wicked princes have scourged
mankind."255 Clinton left out the words "priests and" in the consti-
tution. They appear immediately before "princes."256
Clinton lacked a sufficient sense of irony to include this text. He
also neglected to mention (if he knew) that John Jay, later the
nation's first Chief Justice, proposed in the 1777 Convention that no
252. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
253. Privileged Communications, supra note 208, at 208-09.
254. N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XXXVIII.
And whereas we are required, by the benevolent principles of rational liberty, not
only to expel civil tyranny, but also to guard against that spiritual oppression and
intolerance wherewith the bigotry and ambition of weak and wicked priests and
princes have scourged mankind, This convention doth further, in the name and by
the authority of the good people of this State, ordain, determine, and declare, that
the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without dis-
crimination or preference, shall forever hereafter be allowed, within this State, to
all crimination or preference, shall forever hereafter be allowed, within this State,
to all mankind: Provided, That the liberty of conscience, hereby granted, shall not
be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent
with the peace or safety of this State.
Id.
255. Privileged Communication, supra note 208, at 206 (footnote omitted).
256. Id.; see also supra note 254. The reader will note the absence of the aforemen-
tioned ellipsis in the constitutional provision quoted in the text accompanying footnote 255.
In the Privileged Comnmunications reprint of the case, an editor's note informs the reader of
the missing constitutional language.
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Catholic be permitted to hold land or enjoy civil rights unless he
swore that neither pope nor priest could forgive sins.257 Finally, one
might suspect, from its solicitude of Catholics, that Phillips was as
much a political phenomenon as it was a legal analysis. In fact,
Clinton for years had been deeply involved in a factional frolic for
control of New York's Democratic Republican party.258 Years earli-
er, he had forged an alliance with New York's few thousand (mostly
Irish) Catholics. 5 9 St. Peter's Church had then been the focal point
of Catholic activity in the city, and Clinton had personally quelled a
lethal riot between nativists and Catholics outside St. Peter's
Church.26 St. Peter's was Fr. Kohlmann's parish. Phillips was de-
cided during a very unpopular war with the arch-enemy of Irish Cath-
olics. Clinton's explicit repudiation of British precedent on the subject
helped distinguish the lot of Irish Catholics here from their lot in the
British Empire.
This does not mean that, in Phillips, Clinton acted cynically or
hypocritically. He was undoubtedly a warm friend of Catholic politi-
cal interests. It does mean that an aberrant legal analysis-and Phil-
lips was just that-was jump started by political considerations. It
was not generated by the inner resources of legal doctrine. Given the
more common hostility to Catholics, little wonder that Phillips was
judicially stillborn. The legislature codified the priest-penitent privi-
lege in 1828, and expanded it by prohibiting this kind of testimony
even from clerics willing to give it.26' Had the statutory response
gone the other way, and reaffirmed the compulsion to testify, we
might have had a genuine conduct exemption case. No doubt priests
would have abided their ecclesiastical obligation and suffered the civil
consequences. But such a statute would not be a "law directed at reli-
gion" in any constitutionally significant sense, whatever its dispropor-
tionate impact upon the Roman Catholic religion.
The function of McConnell's idiosyncratic account of "early
judicial interpretation," is unmistakable: without it, the issue would be
settled decisively against the conduct exemption. He writes in summa-
ry:
257. BRADLEY, supra note 90, at 521.
258. See JOHN W. PRATT, RELIGION, PoLITICs, AND DIVERSITY: THE CHURCH-STATE
THEME IN NEW YORK HISTORY 122-29 (1967).
259. See Id.; see also DIXON R. Fox, THE DECLINE OF ARISTOCRACY IN THE POLITICs
OF NEv YORK 1801-1840, 76-78 (Robert V. Remini ed., 1965).
260. See PRATT, supra note 258, at 122-29.
261. See also Id. at 124-29.
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The history subsequent to adoption of the first amendment is incon-
clusive but tends to point against exemptions. One lower court in
New York squarely adopted the exemptions interpretation, and the
supreme courts of Pennsylvania and South Carolina rejected it. None
of these decisions was handed down within twenty years of the first
amendment, and they are therefore weak indicators of the original
understanding. The Pennsylvania holding is entitled to especially
little weight since it was connected to a rejection of constitutional
judicial review in general.262
Below is a summary statement of the antebellum corpus. It is an
excerpt from Specht. I leave it to the reader to judge how powerful it
weighs against the conduct exemption.
The constitution of this state secures freedom of conscience
and equality of religious right. No man, living under the protection
of our institutions, can be coerced to profess any form of religious
belief, or to practise any peculiar mode of worship, in preference to
another. In this respect, the Christian, the Jew, the Mohammedan,
and the Pagan, are alike entitled to protection. Nay, the Infidel, who
madly rejects all belief in a Divine Essence, may safely do so, in
reference to civil punishment, so long as he refrains from the wan-
ton and malicious proclamation of his opinions with intent to out-
rage the moral and religious convictions of a community, the vast
majority of whom are Christians. But beyond this, conscientious
doctrines and practices can claim no immunity from the operation of
general laws made for the government and to promote the welfare
of the whole people.263
Thus, Updegraph v. Commonwealth.2" Justice Bell then explained,
in terms unmistakably Gibsonian, just what was constitutionally pro-
tected:
[T]he right of conscience ... "is simply a right to worship the Su-
preme Being according to the dictates of the heart; to adopt any
creed or hold any opinion whatever, or to support any religion; and
to do, or forbear to do, any act for conscience' sake, the doing or
forbearing of which is not prejudicial to the public weal."
265
To the defendant's claim that the statute worked a prohibited
262. McConnell, supra note 75, at 1513.
263. Specht v. Commonwealth, 8 Pa. 312, 322 (1848).
264. 11 Serg. & Rawle 394 (Pa. 1824).
265. Specht, 8 Pa. at 322 (footnote omitted).
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state preference among sects, the court responded:
Nor can it be objected against the statute that it gives a prefer-
ence to any religious establishment or mode of worship. It leaves all
free alike in the exercise of their distinctive religious tenets, saying
to none, What does thou? As I have said, the selection of the day
of rest is but a question of expediency, and if from the choice fall-
ing on the first day of the week, the Jew and the Seventh-day
Christian suffer the inconvenience of two successive days of with-
drawal from worldly affairs, it is an incidental worldly disadvantage,
temporarily injurious, it may be, to them, but conferring no superior
religious position upon those who worship upon the first day of the
week. The law intends no preference. The command to abstain from
labour is addressed to every citizen, irrespective of his religious be-
lief, and if an inconvenience results to some, it is a consequence of
the generality of the provision. But this affords no argument against
the constitutionality of the law, however strong the argument might
be felt when addressed to the legislature as a reason for a modifica-
tion of the statute.2
Finally, neutrality of reasons and the category of affected actions
is made clear:
But it is argued, with apparent conviction of its truth, that to
compel men to refrain from labour, solely from regard to the imput-
ed holiness of a particular day, is, within the meaning of the con-
stitution, to "control" the religious observance, and to "interfere"
with and constrain the consciences of those who honestly disbelieve
the asserted sanctity of the selected day. We cannot assent to this.
So long as no attempt is made to force upon others the adoption of
the belief entertained by the governing power, or to compel a prac-
tice in accordance with it, so long is conscience left in the enjoy-
ment of its .natural right of individual decision and independent
religious action .... The error of the plaintiff's position is that it
confounds the reason of the prohibition with its actual effect, and
thus mistakes the mere restraint of physical exertion for the fetters
that clog the freedom of mind and conscience .... In this aspect
of the statute there is, therefore, nothing in derogation of the con-
stitutional inhibition.
... It intermeddles not with the natural and indefeasible right
of all men to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of
their own consciences; it compels none to attend, erect, or support
any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry against his con-
266. Id. at 325-26.
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sent; it pretends not to control or to interfere with the rights of con-
science, and it establishes no preference for any religious establish-
ment or mode of worship. It treats no religious doctrine as para-
mount in the state; it enforces no unwilling attendance upon the
celebration of Divine worship. It says not to the Jew or Sabbatarian,
You shall desecrate the day you esteem as holy, and keep sacred to
religion that we deem to be so. It enters upon no discussion of rival
claims of the first and seventh days of the week, nor pretends to
bind upon the conscience of any man any conclusion upon a subject
which each must decide for himself .... It does not, in the slight-
est degree, infringe upon the Sabbath of any sect, or curtail their
freedom of worship. 67
It should be abundantly clear by now that the ratifiers, and suc-
ceeding generations of Americans, were hardly striving for "neutrality
of effect." Case after case recognized incidental, disproportionate
burdens upon believers, particularly upon non-Protestants. Case after
case held that, so long as neutrality of reasons was abid-
ed-provisionally, where that pertained to a certain class of ac-
tions-constitutional guarantees were not implicated.
The "minority" view, so to speak, was not more "liberal." Quite
the contrary. Sprinkled among "neutrality of reasons" were a few
ardent defenses of Christian-meaning Protestant-orthodoxy. I use
that descriptive in no recondite way. An example of what I mean is
Judge Coulter's concurring notation in Specht. He would have upheld
the law "because it guarded the Christian Sabbath from profanation,
and, in the language of the act, prohibited work or worldly employ-
ment on the Lord's Day, commonly called Sunday; and not because
of the mere usefulness of the day as a day of rest and cessation from
worldly 'labour.,
268
This is no warrant for saying that Judge Coulter wanted or
thought it consistent with the Pennsylvania Constitution to convert
Saturday Sabbatarians, or to deny them civil rights. It is fair to say
that he, along with many (probably most) other Americans, recog-
nized an indissoluble bond between its political and civil institutions,
and the Protestantism of its inhabitants. Some official sign of that
bond, Coulter might, and others did, say, was appropriate.
Here we have evidence of the undeniable implicit establishment
267. Id. at 322-25 (emphasis added). For a response to McConnellrs optimistic interpre-
tation of Specht's suggestion that conscience might have been invaded if Specht were divinely
enjoined to work six days a week, see infra text accompanying notes 285-95.
268. Specht, 8 Pa. at 327.
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of Protestantism, which persisted until well into the twentieth century.
Any number of quotations might make the point for the era analyzed
in this Article. For example, in his commentaries, Joseph Story notes
that, when the First Amendment was adopted, "the general, if not
universal., sentiment in America was, that Christianity ought to receive
encouragement from the state, so far as it is not incompatible with
the private rights of conscience, and the freedom of religious wor-
ship."
269
George Thomas provides perhaps a more penetrating expression
of the same phenomenon: "The separation of church and state was
the basis for the unity of Christianity and nation, while moral persua-
sion was the identifying link."270 Historian Bertram Wyatt-Brown
observed that, "[c]ontrary to some historical opinions, the voluntary
church system did not materially alter hopes for making America an
officially Christian republic .... In fact, as [Lyman Beecher] saw it,
the church was freer to press for measures of ethical and spiritual
conformity than ever before. 27' The point of adducing these quota-
tions is not to retreat from "neutrality of reasons." As Story hastens
to say, the quest for a Christian America was subordinate to the con-
stitutional guarantee of free conscience. 2  But we should recognize
that this Protestant hegemony makes "neutrality of effect" thoroughly
inapposite to the early and middle stages of our constitutional tradi-
tion.
So much for the objective of the conduct exemption. Are there
additional, independent arguments against the central role of the judi-
ciary that the conduct exemption presupposes? The issue is approach-
able through the penultimate paragraph of Smith:
It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political
process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices
that are not widely engaged in; but that unavoidable consequence of
democratic government must be preferred to a system in which each
conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the social
importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious be-
269. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §
988 (Carolina Academic Press ed. 1987).
270. GEORGE M. THOMAS, REVIvALSM AND CULTURAL CHANGE: CHRISTIANITY, NATION
BUILDING AND THE MARKET IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES 78 (1989).
271. Bertram Wyatt-Brown, Prelude to Abolitionism: Sabbatarian Politics and the Rise of
the Second Party System, 58 J. AM. HIsT. 316, 319-20 (1971).





For quite a while now, the battle cry of "judicial review" has
been "protect minorities against the will of the majority." We need
look no further than the O'Connor concurrence (in this regard joined
by Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun) for an example:
[Tihe First Amendment was enacted precisely to protect the rights
of those whose religious practices are not shared by the majori-
ty .... The history of our free exercise doctrine amply demon-
strates the harsh impact majoritarian rule has had on unpopular or
emerging religious groups such as the Jehovah's Witnesses and the
Amish.274
And doubtlessly it carries along the conduct exemption. This sounds
like Justice Jackson in Barnette.275
Earlier, I noted cogent philosophical criticism of this construc-
tion.276 The point now is to see that the set of opposing trip-
tyches-courts-rights-minorities versus legislatures-interests-(not
rights)-is ahistorical. Something like it is perceptible only after
about 1830, and widely accepted not before 1850. Historian William
Nelson expressed the point well in an unjustly neglected 1972 arti-
cle.
277
Judges of 1820, that is, unlike judges of today, did not see judicial
review as a mechanism for protecting minority rights against
majoritarian infringement .... Judges of the early nineteenth centu-
ry viewed "the people" as a politically homogeneous and cohesive
body possessing common political goals and aspirations, not as a
congeries of factions and interest groups, each having its own set of
goals and aspirations.278
Judicial review, as it developed after the 1780's was thought,
in sum, only to give the people-a single, cohesive and indivisible
body politic-protection against faithless legislators who betrayed
the trust placed in them, and not to give judges authority to make
law by resolving disputes between interest groups into which the
273. Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1606 (1990).
274. Id. at 1613.
275. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
276. See supra notes 58, 59 and accompanying text.
277. William E. Nelson, Changing Conceptions of Judicial Review: The Evolution of
Constitutional Theory in the States 1790-1860, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 1166 (1972).
278. Id. at 1177.
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people and their legislative representatives were divided. 9
As Don Fehrembacher explained, after noting the dearth of successful
assertions of religious freedom claims in courts in antebellum south-
em courts (apparently there were none),
[s]tate bills of rights, whatever may have been their restraining in-
fluence as guidelines for public officials, were not heavily litigated
documents in the antebellum period. For the defense of liberty,
Americans of that time relied less upon enforcing individual rights
in court than upon preventing the abuse of public authority through
separation of powers, frequent elections, and other such means of
republican control.28
Simply put, the conception of law and politics infrastructural to
the "conduct exemption" did not exist until at least a half-century
after the founding. Only then did a necessary (but far from sufficient)
condition emerge.
In the early national and antebellum eras, judicial review end-
ed-and "legislative supremacy" began-once certain reasons were
deemed to have been excluded from the lawmaking process. As late
as 1861-two months before the firing on Fort Sumter-the New
York Court of Appeals upheld a Sabbatarian prohibition upon Sunday
Theatre.
The act complained of here compels no religious observance, and
offenses against it are punishable not as sins against God, but as
injurious to and having a malignant influence on society .... All
these [other laws against gambling lotteries, polygamy, etc., what we
call "morals legislation"] and many others do to some extent re-
strain the citizen and deprive him of some of his natural
rights .... It is exclusively for the legislature to determine what
acts should be prohibited as dangerous to the community.
[W]hatever the [legislators'] reasons may have been, it was a
matter within the legislative discretion and power, and their will
must stand as the reason of the law.
We could not, if we would, review their discretion and sit in
judgment upon the expediency of their acts. We cannot declare that
innocent which they have adjudged baneful .... 281
279. Id. at 1172.
280. DON E. FEHiRENBACHER, CONSTITUTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE
SLAVEHOLDINO SoUTH 22 (1989).
281. Lindenmuller v. People, 33 N.Y. 548, 573-75 (1861).
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Lindenmuller, like Specht, captures the profound differences of
opinion about institutions between the present conduct exemption
enthusiasts and antebellum Americans. But as to these matters, at
least, the differences persisted into the Lochner era, and beyond. In
1886, the Arkansas Supreme Court disposed of a constitutional chal-
lenge to Sunday closing laws.
The appellant's argument, then, is reduced to this: that because
he conscientiously believes that he is permitted by the law of God
to labor on Sunday, he may violate with impunity a statute declar-
ing it illegal to do so. But a man's religious belief cannot be ac-
cepted as a justification for his committing an overt act made crimi-
nal by the law of the land . . . . If the law operates harshly, as
laws sometimes do, the remedy is in the hands of the legislature. It
is not the province of the judiciary to pass upon the wisdom and
policy of legislation. That is for the members of the legislative de-
partment, and the only appeal from their determination is to the
constituency. 82
It is time to renew work on our provisional account of protected
actions. We have spoken of "worship" widely construed to include
doctrine, discipline, and ritual/liturgy/preaching. Two potential ambi-
guities remain. "Religious liberty," it seems, was a "neutrality of
reasons" constraint upon legislative regulation of doctrine, discipline,
and worship. But "religious liberty" is not a term in either the federal
or state constitutions. Constitutionally considered, it comprises free
exercise and nonestablishment guarantees, and sometimes other provi-
sions, all also collectively known as "freedom of conscience." Is
"worship" (or doctrine or discipline) protected specifically by free
exercise, and not by nonestablishment? I do not think that the materi-
als permit a conclusive answer to this question about division of
labor, if there was one. Since every state had a medley of provisions,
there was no practical need to distinguish the chores done by each, I
have argued elsewhere that nonestablishment meant "no sect prefer-
ence."283 It stands (at least) for the central feature of religious liber-
ty: government neutrality on what distinguished the various churches.
Arguably, it supplies the more powerful thrust for neutrality. Religion
and its "exercise" probably denote doctrine, discipline, and worship.
But "free" means something, too, and it probably signaled "neutrality
282. Scales v. State, I S.W. 769, 772 (Ark. 1886) (citation ornmitted).
283. See BRADLEY, supra note 90.
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of reasons." Hence, my tentative verdict on this potential ambiguity:
the ambiguity remains, but it is not particularly significant. More rea-
sons follow.
The materials indicate that there is a definable class of actions
protected by the religious liberty clauses, and that class is not (most
emphatically) whatever believers made it. More than one opinion
consulted a plaintiff's religion to refute precisely such sugges-
tions.1 4 But there is evidence in those opinions and elsewhere that
Scalia might be right, that the list of eligible actions might be open-
ended. To be sure, "religiously motivated conduct" is a term foreign
to the historical sources. Wolf, Benjamin, and Specht all promised
more serious judicial scrutiny had the plaintiff been under a divine
command to work six days a week (and not just to refrain from work
one specific day). Specht refers to a constitutional right "to do or
forbear to do, any act for conscience sake.""28
Now, none of this is persuasive evidence of Sherbert. There are
no holdings establishing an open set of protected actions, and courts'
willingness to inspect the creed and doctrines of believers makes clear
that we are not talking about untethered individuals. We are talking
about the freedom of churches and organized religion. And there is
little doubt which way the pendulum would swing once "acts for con-
science sake" broke out in antinomianism. That is Reynolds v. United
States,286 the first square confrontation with "an act for conscience
sake," and it presented no constitutional claim at all!
But Reynolds, apart from its hostile tone and allowing for its
unartful phrasing, did not contract antebellum holdings.287 We are
mistaken in distinguishing the class of eligible actions from neutrality
of reasons. It is analytically possible, but now it is time to use Specht
to improve upon our provisional definition. In the above paragraph, I
excerpted part of a passage from Specht to suggest an expansive
class of eligible actions. The full quotation reads "to do, or forbear to
do, any act for conscience sake, the doing or forbearing of which is
not prejudicial to the public weal.,288 The portion previously omit-
ted is part of the definition of eligible actions.
284. See Commonwealth v. Wolf, 3 Serg. & Rawle 48, 49 (Pa. 1817); Charleston v.
Benjamin, 33 S.C.L. (2 Strob.) 508, 528 (1846).
285. Specht v. Commonwealth, 8 Pa. 312, 322 (1848).
286. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
287. Id. at 145.
288. Specht, 8 Pa. at 322 (emphasis added).
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We are at the doorstep of the latent but profound
"majoritarianism" of the original meaning of the Free Exercise
Clause, and of religious liberty generally. Specht leads us to it, and
here there is no doubt that it is representative of the antebellum cor-
pus. "Neutrality of reasons" is the dominant factor, and it is a func-
tion of legislators' behavior. Do they, in fact, propose some theologi-
cal belief or form of worship to citizens, and oblige assent (or at
least outward conformity) to it? Judges did not consult legislative
debates in answering that question. They "consulted" commonly ac-
cepted accounts of the purpose of, for instance, blasphemy laws.
Blackstone or People v. Ruggles289 or Updegraph v. Common-
wealth,290 not statehouse debates, were the sources. The occasional
judicial voice, Newman29 for instance, opining that Sabbath obser-
vance ran afoul of neutral reasons, suggests serious inquiry into the
matter. But the Newman court produced no record of legislative de-
bates either. The judicial conclusion: in a land devoted to religious
liberty (i.e., neutrality of reasons), blasphemy laws could have no
other purpose than preservation of public place and order.292
This reinforcement worked a practical limitation of eligible con-
duct to doctrine, discipline, and worship, as Protestants understood
them. Apart from those differentiating features, and especially since
nonsectarian religion was fit for state promotion, Christian legislators
simply would not be proposing obedience to religious doctrines.
Hence, Congress prohibited polygamy not because a religious doctrine
or ritual called "monogamy" was the preferred theology. Polygamy
was thought immoral, and a threat to the good order of society. The
Reynolds court supposed So.293
The defining perspective was the Christian one of legislators.
The norm remained universal. Jews, turks, and infidels were all pro-
tected by religious liberty from forced assent to religious propos-
als.294 But the distinction between religious and non-religious rea-
sons-neutrality-was not ecumenical. There was a single frame of
reference, and it was not, nor did it aspire to be, equally Muslim and
Protestant (if such a perspective is imaginable). Morality, to cite one
289. 8 Johns. 290 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811).
290. 11 Serg. & Rawle 394 (Pa. 1824).
291. Ex parte Newman, 9 Cal. 502, 513-16 (1858).
292. Id. at 502.
293. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166-67.




presently contentious area of state regulation, was securely distin-
guished from religion. Religious liberty had no impact upon what we
call morals legislation.
With these caveats we may reapproach Wolf, Benjamin, and
other examples of open-ended eligible actions like Smith's. That the
believer was under a divine injunction to work six days a week, I
suggest, might have mattered not because (like Sherbert) Free Exer-
cise analysis depended upon the idiosyncracies of individual commit-
ments. That a law clashed directly with such a divine injunction was
unfortunate, but legally remarkable for two other reasons. The clash
suggested greater judicial inquiry into neutral reasons, to make sure
legislators were not attacking the believer's religion. It also was occa-
sion to suggest recourse to the legislature, with a judicial letter of
recommendation.
McConnell explicitly questions this worship/neutrality of reasons
account of free exercise.295 He knows that it is the only likely his-
torical alternative. His argument against it relies, oddly enough, upon
constitutional developments in Pennsylvania. He says that,
"[i]nterestingly, Pennsylvania (a state whose substantial Quaker popu-
lation had an interest in exemptions) revised its constitutional protec-
tion for liberty of conscience in 1790, removing the language that
had limited it to acts of worship." '296 Frankly, the change, from a
purely grammatical viewpoint, suggests only that some additional,
other "rights of conscience" have been added to "the right of con-
science in the free exercise of religious worship."297 That implies
that no change in the latter is implied.
More distressing is the manner in which McConnell arbitrarily
handles supporting evidence. A look at the entire religious freedom
provision of each constitution (that is, the Pennsylvania Constitutions
of 1776 and 1790)298 shows that McConnell, by leaving out
295. McConnell, supra note 75, at 1461.
296. Id.
297. See PA. CONST. of 1776, art. I.
298. PA. CONST. of 1776, art. II; PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § I.
II. That all men have a natural and unalienable right to worship Almighty God
according to the dictates of their own consciences and understanding: And that no
man ought or of right can be compelled to attend any religious worship, or erect
or support any place of worship, or maintain any ministry, contrary to, or against,
his own free will and consent: Nor can any man, who acknowledges the being of
a God, be justly deprived or abridged of any civil right as a citizen, on account
of his religious sentiments or peculiar mode of religious worship: And that no
authority can or ought to be vested in, or assumed by Any power whatever, that
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most299 of them, has radically altered the nature of the shift. In any
event, we know what the 1790 constitution empowered courts to do
in the commonwealth-starting with Stansbury in 1792, and up to
Specht in 1848.
McConnell says that, "[i]n none of the state free exercise cases
in the early years of the Republic did the lawyers argue or the courts
hold that religiously motivated conduct was unprotected because it
was not 'worship."' 300 McConnell's observation is true in this trivial
sense: no case left action unprotected only because it was not wor-
ship. Otherwise, McConnell is mistaken. Many cases expressly used
"worship" as a term of limitation. They did so along with other
intracommunal activities like doctrine and discipline. Action that was
none of them was unprotected. McConnell also says that it is unlikely
that ritual conduct would be so subordinated to pious living. This is
not only likely, but exactly what happened, partly because morality
rested upon transectarian objective bases, and was legally enforceable.
In support of neither objection does McConnell offer any authority or
supporting observations.3°'
Pennsylvania is a good place to lay bare some of the deeper
sources of McConnell's ahistoricism. He treats religious freedom as
paradigmatically an individual right, asserted over and against collec-
tive interests. By' doing so, McConnell overlooks a burgeoning load
of scholarship showing that the fundamental natural right in the Rev-
olutionary and early republican eras was the right of a community to
shall in any' case interfere with, or in any manner control, the right of conscience
in the free exercise of religious worship.
PA. CONST. of 1776, art. H.
That all men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty
God according to the dictates of their own consciences; that no man can of right
be compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship, or to maintain any
ministry, against his consent; that no human authority can, in any case whatever,
control or interfere with the rights of conscience; and that no preference shall ever
be given, by law, to any religious establishments or modes of worship.
PA. CONST. of 1790, art. Ix, § I.
299. McConnell, supra note 75.
The 1776 Declaration of Rights of the Inhabitants of the State of Pennsylvania
states that "no authority can or ought to be vested in, or assumed by any power
whatever, that shall in any case interfere with, or in any manner control, the right
of conscience in the free exercise of religious worship." . . . The 1790 Pennsylva-
nia Constitution states that -no human authority can, in any case whatever, control
or interfere with the rights of conscience."
Id. at 1461 n.255 (citations omitted).




be governed by laws of its own choosing.0 2 Republican government
was the paramount liberty. 33 Liberty was identity between the peo-
ple and its representatives, as Nelson's account of judicial review sug-
gests.304 Religious liberty was not the trump card of individual au-
tonomy.
We have good reason to see religious liberty primarily as free-
dom of churches and secondarily as that of individuals in relation to
the churches. Palmer has brought these factors together with specific
reference to Pennsylvania. "The Pennsylvania Constitution, even in its
declaration of rights, was not oriented directly to individual fulfill-
ment; it considered the communal right to qualify liberties as impor-
tant as the individual's right to be free from governmental interfer-
ence."
305
At its deepest level, McConnell's historical argument seems to be
an act of faith; not in God, but in what a people who believed in a
sovereign God must have done when they came together for the draft-
ing of the Constitution in 1789.
To deny that the government has an obligation to defer, where pos-
sible, to the dictates of religious conscience is to deny that there
could be anything like 'God' that could have a superior claim on
the allegiance of the citizens-to assert that government is, in prin-
ciple, the ultimate authority.0 6
At its very core, Free Exercise reflected this "theological posi-
tion. 30 7
This impassioned sentence is partly rhetoric. It serves
McConnell's polemic against historical figures like Jefferson, and con-
temporary scholars (like Walter Berns) who, according to McConnell,
assert the priority of the political over the religious. 30 8 McConnell
(claiming Madison as an ally) insists that religious liberty proceeded
302. See, e.g., GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPuBLIc: 1776-
1787, 61-62 (1969); Russell Hittinger, Liberalism and the American Natural Law Tradition,
25 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 429, 445-49 (1990); Robert C. Palmer, Liberties as Constitutional
Provisions: 1776-1791, reprinted in WILLIAM E. NELSON & ROBERT C. PALMER, LIBERTY
AND COMMUNITY: CONSTITUTION AND RIGHTS IN THE EARLY AMERIcAN REPUBLIC 55 (1987)
[hereinafter NELSON & PALMER].
303. NELSON & PALMER, supra note 302, at 64.
304. Nelson, supra note 277.
305, Id.
306. McConnell, supra note 9, at 1152.
307. Id.
308. McConnell, supra note 75, at 1442.
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from religious, rather than political, premises. 9 (For what it is
worth, I think McConnell is right.) But this debate, whatever its his-
torical value, is no surrogate for a debate about the original meaning
of the Free Exercise Clause.
This impassioned sentence is also partly substance. As far as I
can tell, McConnell's allegiance to the conduct exemption is deeply
indebted to this theological conviction. For McConnell, the sovereign-
ty of God is at stake in the debate over Smith. To this conviction I
offer two rejoinders. One is the founders' view of the matter. They
affirmed the sovereignty of God and eschewed conduct exemptions.
Why cannot McConnell? Two, I think it is imprudent to bet so much
on so little. That is, no majestic, foundational claim like the "sover-
eignty of God" can ride on the precise contours of judicial construc-
tion of one clause in any positive enactment, including our Constitu-
tion.
My discussion has so far been about state practice. What of the
federal Free Exercise Clause, which, after all, is the subject of the
day? I agree with McConnell that the basic building blocks3"'-free
exercise, establishment, religion-were apprehended by the state ratifi-
ers as they generally understood identical terms in their state consti-
tutions. Use of terms like "respecting," "prohibits," or "interfere" in
the First Congress reflected no substantive disagreement among its
members as to what they wanted to say. The consensus exhibited
then reinforces the argument for similarity between state and federal
provisions. And we know what the state provisions meant.
Might "the federal proposers have used the basic building blocks
and, by an eclectic use of modifiers, given birth to the conduct ex-
emption? No. Why not? Most basically, because the federal
proposers' designs are unimportant absent evidence of apprehension
of them by the ratifiers. There is none. Also, federal use of the term
"religion," rather than standard state use of "sect," could mean only
(if it meant anything distinctive) a wider class of persons protected.
The federal provisions thus protected the Roman Catholics and Jews,
who were frequently discriminated against by the states. This venture
beyond Protestantism (if that is what it was) is unlikely to have been
joined to an expansion of the class of actions protected (say, from
"worship" to all "religiously motivated conduct").
There is another portentous change in wording from state to
309. Id. at 1446.
310. Id. at 1456.
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federal bills of rights. The latter is marked (not exclusively) by pe-
remptory language: "shall," as opposed to the exhortatory "ought" of
state constitutions.31 This change probably signals an expectation of
federal judicial enforcement. But that, too, cuts against expansion.
With judicial enforcement would come efforts to render more specific,
if not technical, the meaning of the norm.
"Congress shall make no law . ... "' This means that a
class of legislation is forbidden. A class is definable by foreclosing
legislative adoption of truth claims of one or another church. But the
conduct exemption does not forbid a class of legislation. It invites
judges to compare the effect of believer autonomy upon public peace
and order, the day-to-day tranquility of the community. But federal
judges were not responsible for public peace and order. Nor was the
federal government as a whole. The states were. Put differently, the
conduct exemption is a balancing test of individual autonomy and
public peace. But the latter is not within the ken of the federal judg-
es doing the balancing.
The widespread suspicion of federal courts voiced during the
federalist/antifederalist ratification controversy reinforces this conclu-
sion. "Antifederalists spent a considerable amount of time criticizing
the judicial article .. . .They saw in the provisions for the federal
judiciary the potential for a consolidating aristocracy."31 3 Are we to
believe that a provision that mentions only "Congress," and that uses
familiar terms, transferred a previously unimagined power to these
feared judges? No.
But, the objector says, the congressional Framers did not use
language clearly reflecting their intentions. Why did they not say
"worship" or "neutrality of reasons?" Basically, they did, in the usage
of their (if not our) day. There is no evidence that federal courts
entertained some other interpretation. But this objection can be dis-
patched most efficiently by turning it around: if the Framers had
intended to transfer from legislatures to courts the power over reli-
gion that the conduct exemption implies, they would not have used
familiar language at all! They would have had to invent a new
phrase!
311. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I.
312. See, e.g., id.
313. Boyd Clifton Rist, The Jeffersonian Crisis Revived: Virginia, the Court, and the





In his magisterial 1985 survey, The Constitution in the Supreme
Court, David Currie noted the scarcity of historical defenses of the
conduct exemption.3"4 He observed that defenses tended to be "poli-
cy" oriented.31 5 McConnell, in 1990, noted the same scarcity,
3,6
and sought to remedy it. He has been unsuccessful. McConnell's
historical methodology is perverse. Within its own terms, his analysis
is frequently arbitrary and his conclusions are quite overdrawn. We
have heard argument, and it is time to pronounce final judgment:
conduct exemptions cannot be squared with an originalist account of
constitutional law. Twenty-seven years of precedent (the period from
Sherbert to Smith) are not enough to overcome plain meaning, histori-
cally recovered, and one hundred seventy years of faithful construc-
tion (the period from the founding to Sherbert). I submit (though I
do not claim warrants to pronounce conclusively) that any serious ac-
count of constitutional construction holds no place for the conduct
exemption.
Now, in 1991, McConnell expresses a preference for deciding
Smith on the basis of "constitutional text and tradition," as opposed
to "normative judgments., 31 7 "But," he concludes in carefully cho-
sen words, "if it is necessary to confront the normative question di-
rectly" he would prefer the conduct exemption to constitutional law
based upon the text and tradition.31 8
If the conduct exemption is to be supported by "policy" or sus-
tained by "normative" nonconstitutional convictions, what are they? A
good guess is suggested by Sherbert's vintage: 1963. That was proba-
bly the high-water mark of Warren Court judicial activism, just two
years before Griswold v. Connecticut,31 9 and five years after
Britain's Wolfenden Commission Report32 proposed to decriminal-
ize homosexual acts, a recommendation that touched off what remains
the center of legal theoretical debate: enforcement of so-called private
morality, opposition to which is the earmark of contemporary liberalism.32'
314. DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT 441 n.77 (1985).
315. Id.
316. See McConnell, supra note 75, at 1413-15.
317. Id. at 1153.
318. Id.
319. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
320. COMMIrEE ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND PROSTITUTION, THE WOLFENDEN
REPORT (1957).
321. See Robert P. George, Social Cohesion and the Legal Enforcement of Morals, 35
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This liberalism is not what the Democratic party is and what the
Republican Party is not. It is the philosophical tradition tracing back
to Locke, arguably embraced by Kant, and transmitted by Mill.
322
Renowned contemporary defenders include John Rawls,3 23 Ronald
Dworkin,324  David Richards,325  and Bruce Ackerman.326  Its dis-
tinguishing features are the "harm" and "neutrality" principles: gov-
ernment ought be "neutral" among conceptions of what is good or
right for individuals to do, and possesses no right to coerce or to
discourage conduct unless the conduct "harms" persons who have not
consented to engage in it.
This liberalism has infiltrated and taken over our church-state
corpus. (Smith rolls it back a significant bit.) Its influence is some-
times subtly introduced. It used to be commonly observed that sectar-
ian disputes-disagreements about speculative theology, liturgy, and
Church polity-led to political divisiveness and eventually to settle-
ments like that wrought by the Framers. That is, to treat such dis-
putes as matters of divergent opinion and unite people on other bases.
Now, philosopher Jeffrey Stout opines that "what made the creation
of liberal institutions necessary was the manifest failure of religious
groups of various sorts to establish rational agreement on their com-
peting detailed visions of the good life."327 All questions of what
constitutes genuine human flourishing, according to Stout, have been
bracketed due to now divisive moral pluralism. But moral pluralism is
unquestionably a recent development, dating to sometime after World
War II.
Michael McConnell strenuously resists what he perceives to be
the secularism of contemporary liberalism, but he embraces liberal
political morality, and ties it to the -conduct exemption. For
McConnell, Free Exercise vanquishes state paternalism in all matters
affecting the good life.
Obvious connections exist between the scope of free exercise right
defined by these provisions and the wider liberal political theory of
AM. J. JuRIS. 15 (1990).
322. See John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, reprinted in THE UTILITARIANS 475-600 (Anchor
Books ed. 1973).
323, See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JuSTIcE (1971).
324. See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINcIPLE (1985); RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S
EMPIRE (1986); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
325. See DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION (1986).
326. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980).
327. JEFFREY STOUT, ETHICS AFTER BABEL 212 (1988).
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which they are an expression. The central conception of liberalism,
as summarized in the Declaration of Independence, is that govern-
ment is instituted by the people in order to secure their rights to
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Governmental powers are
limited to those needed to secure these legitimate ends. In contrast
to both ancient and modem non-liberal regimes, government is not
charged with promotion of the good life for its citizens. Except as
needed for mutual protection and a limited class of common inter-
ests, government must leave the definition of the good life to pri-
vate institutions, of which family and church are the most conspicu-
ous. Even in the absence of a free exercise clause, liberal theory
would find the assertion of governmental power over religion illegit-
imate, except to the extent necessary for the protection of oth-
ers.
32 8
The liberal conflagration of religious and moral autonomy is
perfectly captured in a brief of 885 law professors in a recent Su-
preme Court case.
The right of personal privacy stands against state domination over
matters crucial to self-possession: self-definition in matters of value
and conscience, and self-determination regarding ways and walks of
life. By its force, government's hand is stayed from the diverse
choices by which persons define their values, form, and maintain
communities of belief and practice.329
That explains opposition to Smith. It is also indistinguishable
from key arguments in Bowers v.. Hardwick,330 the consensual sod-
omy case, and Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health,33' the
"right-to-die" case. But the argument is not from any of those cases.
It was filed in the 1989 case of Webster v. Reproduction Health
Servs.,332 the abortion counselling decision. It was the linchpin of
the pro-choice view.
The worshiping community has been supplanted in our church-
state doctrines by the religiously motivated individual, bearing a right
to command neutrality between "religion and nonreligion." Out of this
transformation emerges an undifferentiated private sphere, the scene
of all meaningful (i.e., value laden) human action. "Private" action is
328. McConnell, supra note 75, at 1465.
329. See Record Brief at 6, School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (No. 83-990).
330. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). The arguments are most accessible in the dissent by Justice
Blackmun. See id. at 211-13.
331. I10 S. Ct. 2841, 2884-89 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
332. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
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all that a person chooses-for whatever reason-to do that does no
harm to others. Effaced is the distinction that allowed the founders to
condemn even religiously propelled licentiousness. "Religious liberty"
is the trump card of the emancipated self, overruling all state policies
exceeding the harm and neutrality principles.
Any lingering mystery about the conduct exemption's lineage
may be dispelled by the following samples from recent church-state
opinions of the Supreme Court. They signal the pivotal transition
from freedom of religion to individual freedom of choice for or
against religious commitments: "Cantwell, of course, is but one case
in which the Court has identified the individual's freedom of con-
science as the central liberty that unifies the various Clauses of the
First Amendment.
33
[T]he Court has unambiguously concluded that the individual free-
dom of conscience protected ... embraces the right to select any
religious faith or not at all. This conclusion derives support...
from the conviction that religious beliefs worthy of respect are the
product of free and voluntary choice by the faithful . .. 331
Such indoctrination [exemplified by Title I] ... would have devas-
tating effects on the right of each individual voluntarily to determine
what to believe (and what not to believe) free of any coercive pres-
sures from the State .. .
[A]n important concern ... is whether the symbolic union of
church and state effected by . . .governmental action is sufficiently
likely to be perceived by adherents ... as an endorsement, and by
the nonadherents as a disapproval, of their individual religious
choices ... [Symbolic union] is most likely to influence children of
tender years, whose experience is limited and whose beliefs conse-
quently are the function of environment as much as of free and
voluntary choice.336
The solution to this problem [of religion and society] adopted by
the Framers and consistently recognized by this Court is jealously to
guard the right of every individual to worship according to the dic-
tates of conscience while requiring the government to maintain a
course of neutrality among religions, and between religion and
333. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 49, 50 (1985).
334. Id. at 53.
335. School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 371, 385 (1985).
336. Id. at 390.
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nonreligion. Only in this way can we "make room for as wide a
variety of beliefs and creeds as the spiritual needs of man deem
necessary" and "sponsor an attitude on the part of government that
shows no partiality to any one group and lets each flourish accord-
ing to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its dogma."337
Michael Sandel summarizes this development:
The respect this neutrality commands is not, strictly speaking, re-
spect for religion, but respect for the self whose religion it is, or
respect for the dignity that consists in the capacity to choose one's
religion freely. Religious beliefs are "worthy of respect," not in
virtue of what they are beliefs in, but rather in virtue of being "the
product of free and voluntary choice," in virtue of being beliefs of a
self unencumbered by convictions antecedent to choice.338
The only way for the conduct exemption to avoid obsoles-
cence-for it to escape collapse into a project rendering it superflu-
ous-is to keep "religion" as a term of limitation, to keep freedom of
conscience devoted to religion and not to the emancipated, autono-
mous self. This may be the intention of some believers who defend
the doctrine, though certainly not the ACLU, People for the American
Way, the American Humanist Associates, and Justices Brennan, Mar-
shall, and Blackmun. They realize that the doctrine is an efficient
engine for the maintenance of the neutral secular state, the playpen of
the autonomous self. It is ticketed to rid the polity of any trace of
the authority of religion, and of the moral tradition.
Can "religious liberty" be saved from a takeover by the autono-
mous self? We have already seen that some theorists (e.g., Rawls and
Richards) attempt no rescue. Can those who try, succeed?
There is reason for optimism. Many cases say that only beliefs
rooted in religion are protected by the Free Exercise Clause; that
personal philosophical views or a traditional way of life are not pro-
tected.3 39 But now consider some illustrations of this term of limita-
337. Id. at 382 (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952)). In an impressive,
recent article, Richard Myers argues that the Supreme Court's liberal privatization efforts
(which he thinks I overstated in my earlier article) crested about 1986. See Richard Myers,
The Supreme Court and the Privatization of Religion 41 CATH. U. L. REv. (forthcoming,
May, 1992).
338. Michael J. Sandel, Freedom of Conscience or Freedom of Choice?, reprinted in
ARTICLES OF FAITH, ARTICLES OF PEACE: THE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY CLAUSES AND THE AMER-
ICAN PuBLIc PHILOSOPHY 74, 86 (James Davison Hunter & Os Guinness eds., 1990).
339. See, e.g., Frazee v. Illinois Dep't. of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989) (hold-
ing that refusal to work on Sundays for religious reasons was protected by the Free Exercise
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tion. A California couple managed to get to trial for Free Exercise
violation of their religion. 40 Members of their Church of the Most
High God worshipped the Egyptian God of fertility, Isis. This faith
originated a few years back in a revelation to Mr. Wilber Tracy, in a
beach bungalow in Santa Monica. In a brilliant flash of light, God
appeared to Mr. Tracy. This God was in great physical shape. But
"he didn't work out," Mr. Tracy testified at trial. "He didn't need
to."
3 4 '
So far so good, I guess. But Tracy attracted the authorities' at-
tention for practicing what seemed to be the only two principles of
church discipline: "absolution" through sex with a high priestess
(Mrs. Tracy) and a "sacrifice" of money. "High priestess" status was
no sinecure; a thousand confessions need be heard before "ordina-
,,342
tion.
State v. Hodge 343 is the most colorful conduct exemption case
that I have encountered. Robert Hodges was indicted for tampering
with utility metering devices.3 44 He appeared for trial in his "spiritu-
al attire," proclaiming, "it is my religious belief and I have never
worn anything else in court but this when I am on trial. 345 His
outfit consisted of, in the words of the appellate court reviewing his
citation for contempt,
brown and white fur tied around his body at his ankles, loins and
head, with a like vest made out of fur, and complete with eye gog-
gles over his eyes. He had colored his face and chest with a very
pale green paint or coloring. He had what appeared to be a human
skull dangling from his waist and in his hand he carried a stuffed
snake. His legs were also naked from mid-way between his knee
and waist to his ankles. He appeared to be carrying a military gas
mask and other unidentifiable ornaments.346
Mercifully, he admitted to being the sole adherent of this eclectic
faith.
Clause of the First Amendment); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 713 (1981) (holding
that philosophical opposition to war is not the same as a religious belief).
340. See Judge Weighing Claims of a Religion Based on Sex, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1990,
at All (hereinafter Judge Weighing Claims].
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. 695 S.W.2d 171 (Tenn. 1985).
344. Id. at 171.
345. Id. at 172.
346. Id. at 171.
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The point is not that the Tracys and Mr. Hodges are typical of
conduct exemption plaintiffs. I trust that they are not. The point is
that conduct exemption doctrine is incapable of distinguishing them
from persons who are typical. All conduct exemption plaintiffs are
lumped together generically as "religiously motivated individuals."
Plaintiffs like Mr. Hodges also evidence the all too common concep-
tion of religion as a non-cognitive enterprise.
Frazee v. Illinois,347 a 1989 Supreme Court decision, under-
scores the impotence of religion as a term of limitation. The Frazee
Court held tight to an admittedly challenging distinction between
religious and secular beliefs.348 That distinction might survive if re-
ligious liberty focused upon churches. We might, as was the case
until well into the twentieth century, look to recognized or established
religious groupings as an indicator of genuine religious conviction.
Reference to a community served to verify sincerity and weed out the
fraudulent opportunist or fair-weather believer. Religious communities
maintained a robust prescription for walking in the way of the Lord.
No one would adopt an entire way of life to avoid an unpleasant
civic duty. It would also protect religion's respectability from slurs of
non-cognitiveness. Surely, there will not be a whole church full of
chickens.
Frazee forecloses these routes. Mr. Frazee claimed membership
in no sect, adherence to no dogma.349 He did not even assert an in-
dividuated, coherent set of beliefs. He asserted belief in "Bible reli-
gion" with one salient tenet: no labor on the Sabbath.350 We cannot
end run Frazee by explaining that his interpretation of Scripture is
unfounded (or to Jehovah's Witnesses' that Scripture really does not
prohibit transfusions). The Benjamin and Wolf courts did something
like that. But what in Mr. Frazee's (or Mr. Hodges' or the Tracys')
"religion" would we consult?
Courts cannot insist that believers reconcile contradictions in
their own beliefs, or state them with clarity. As Michael McConnell
says, the claimant's beliefs need not be "consistent, coherent, clearly
articulated, or congruent with those of the claimant's religious denom-
ination. 351' The Thomas Court opined that religious claims need not
347. 489 U.S. 829 (1989).
348. Id. at 1517.
349. Id. at 1516.
350. Id.
351. McConnell, supra note 75, at 1417.
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even be "comprehensible" to outsiders to merit First Amendment
protection.352 What further aid to the non-cognitivist charge is need-
ed?
There can be no second-guessing or finessing through reinterpre-
tation of the proffered religion. Believers who claim an identity with
a tradition do not even have to get it right. For instance, a plaintiff
might argue that, as a professing Roman Catholic, he cannot work in
a bank alongside non-Catholics. One would look in vain for official
verification of this, or another Catholic who so believes. No matter. It
is "a sincere conviction" that one's religion (whatever it is) is bur-
dened that starts the suit, not a sincere adherence to a definable reli-
gion. The religious tenet itself is subject to no critical analysis.
"Sincere conviction" need not pass a "straight face" test; one
cannot read with a straight face some of the claims that courts have
accepted. Mr. Hodges settles that. Besides, the point of the exercise is
to overcome our prejudices, to avoid imposing our categories upon
the assertions of others. It is defined negatively: sincere conviction is
whatever a plaintiff claims, save what is a clear, undeniable, and
patently attempted fraud. One of the very few religions to fail to pass
this test was the Neo-American church. Members were called "Boo
Hoos," its theme was "Puff The Magic Dragon," and its motto was
"Victory over Horseshit." That its only function was the illegal use of
narcotics finally persuaded a court to place it beyond the pale.353
Other examples are pretty much limited to the tax evasion schemes of
blue collar workers354 who get together and ordain each other as
ministers of Ralph and Joe's Temple of God and Storm Door Repair
Company, or something similar.
"Burden" is no more formidable an obstacle. How could it be?
Given the infinite latitude available to plaintiffs in defining the sub-
stance of their beliefs, no imagination is required to bring belief itself
into open conflict with the legal provision being challenged.
Smith exemplifies how conduct exemption analysis is there for
the asking, how religion is not only undefinable, but an empty shell
inhabited by the autonomous self. The Supreme Court treated both
Smith and Black as "members" of the Native American Church who
"ingested peyote for sacramental purposes" at a church ceremony.
355
352. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981).
353. See United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439 (D.D.C. 1968).
354. See Judge Weighing Claims, supra note 340, at All, A13.
355. Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1597 (1990).
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As far as I can tell from the state court opinions, there was no factu-
al basis for those conclusions. It is hard to say what was found as
fact, because the Oregon Supreme Court did not seem to care. The
lower appeals court remanded for answers to these questions,356 but
the higher court ruled without waiting for them.357
A recent New York Times article,358 based upon interviews
with Black, Smith, and one of their lawyers, reveals that Black (cer-
tainly) and Smith (possibly) were not church members. Each was
evidently a guest at the ceremony, and neither ingested peyote "sacra-
mentally," if, by that we mean (as we should), with belief in the sur-
rounding web of beliefs and practices. Still, the United States Su-
preme Court held that religion was burdened.
Whose religion? Not Smith's and Black's-the courts have no
definition of religion, no way to test sincerity, and no interest in
determining plaintiffs' attachment to the religion talked about in the
cases. The conduct exemption does not need to know if Black and
Smith believe anything at all, much less if they believe in Native
American spirituality. Someone without a scintilla of religious convic-
tion could, right now, attend a Native American ritual and ingest
peyote to see what it was like. If some legally cognizable harm visit-
ed him for so doing, he is a conduct exemption plaintiff. All he need
allege is what Galen Black did: that he did it for "spiritual" reasons.
What is "spiritual?" Whatever the "spiritualist" chooses to attach
some spiritual significance to. (Pantheism, anyone?)
For all practical purposes, conduct exemption plaintiffs are self-
designated. Courts (following the lead of government lawyers) do not
contest assertions of a burdened conscience. How could they, in the
regime of individuated religion that the doctrine inhabits and sup-
ports? The purpose of the doctrine-promotion of ideal conditions for
unencumbered self-choice-does not require that live, religious com-
mitments of this plaintiff actually be distressed; just that someone's
might be. The doctrine secures a collective good, a judicial demarca-
tion of the public/private realm with the government securely on the
former side. Its sphere consists (more or less) of prevention of force
and fraud, or commodious living, or facilitating the quest of private
selves for meaningful identities. However articulated, this service is
356. See Black v. Employment Div., 707 P.2d 1274, 1279-80 (Or. 1985).
357. See Smith v. Employment Div., 721 P.2d 445, 451 (Or. 1986).




occasioned by action of what now must be viewed as a private attor-
ney general with no necessary connection to the belief system impact-
ed. No more is required by courts, nor dictated by the purpose driv-
ing the conduct exemption. Smith and Black prosecute a qui tam
action.
A student survey of one hundred or so randomly selected con-
duct exemption cases from 1979 to 1989 demonstrates that "religion"
has no analytical significance, and that "burden" has very little."9
In the exceptional case, where courts detect no burden,3" they say
that the states' interests are compelling enough to defeat the plaintiff.
That means that courts decide these cases (almost always against
aggrieved "sincere believers") by immediate recourse to, and valida-
tion of, the government interests involved. If plaintiffs do not neces-
sarily have their religious commitments at stake-and almost invari-
ably lose-what is the point of conduct exemption analysis? The
point is, most fundamentally, just what its proponents define as the
central purpose of constitutional law, the judicial maintenance of the
boundaries to legislative action thrown up by liberalism. The conduct
exemption is the harm and neutrality principles.
I happen to believe that the harm and neutrality principles have
no place in a sound political theory. I do not rely upon that belief, or
my reasons for it, in the following criticisms. Even one who embrac-
es liberalism should scorn its demagogic and false promotional cam-
paign. But for liberalism judicially enforced, we would be engulfed in
sectarian warfare. (Or is that the Establishment Clause advertisement?)
The free exercise "ad" says, "Today, peyote; tomorrow, communion
wine or kosher food. If judges don't do Sherbert, the majority's po-
grom will soon visit your church or temple." The plausibility of this
mindless, negative appeal (Willie Horton is high-brow by comparison)
is self-generated. Like all good advertising, it is designed to convince
you that you need something that you really do not need. If we are
to buy liberalism, let us wittingly do so. Liberalism should not be a
rider to our purchase of, for example, freedom to attend Catholic
Mass.
I question whether the conduct exemption really serves religious
liberty. Defenders say, "Why not give plaintiffs a second bite at the
apple? If they lose politically, they might (occasionally) win judicial-
359. Anthony Cavallo, The Free Exercise of Religion: Is it Truly Free or Merely Conve-
nient to the State? (Apr., 1990) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
360. See, e.g., United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1989).
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ly. Why not? What is the harm?" Well, "neutrality of ef-
fect"-government must not supply reasons for or against adopting a
particular religion's viewpoint-is virtually the "no endorsement"
Establishment Clause analysis.3 6' It has invalidated many legislative
victories for religious minorities.3 62 If you doubt this identification,
note the non-coincidental devotion of Justices Brennan and Marshall,
as well as the ACLU, to both conduct exemptions and the "no en-
dorsement" analysis. Justice Stevens is a contrary example with diffi-
culties all his own. He is pro-endorsement, 363 anti-conduct exemp-
tion.364 He seems to be a "super-liberal": the state should not notice
religious reasons, even in the actions of citizens adversely impacted
by neutral laws. His attempts to work this strategy out have shown
him to be, at best, theologically and philosophically unsophisticat-
ed. 365
What's the harm? Demand a full accounting of the net effect, so
to speak, upon religious liberty of liberalism's takeover of our reli-
gion clause jurisprudence. Other than the ambivalent "neutrality" of
relegating all religiously motivated conduct to the private realm,366
the record shows that liberalism is no friend of believers.
I should like now to suggest another, more sinister, function of
the conduct exemption cases. The question, given the predictable
plaintiff's loss, is what difference does going to court make? As the
surrounding rhetoric is designed to 'convince, an obligation that, be-
fore adjudication, was a product of majoritarian intolerance, indiffer-
ence, or ignorance (or all three), is now the product of, well, a most
searching scrutiny by a tolerant, caring judge who has held the state
to the highest standard of justification. The marshal then enforces the
361. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (holding that a Christmas display
that included a creche, along with other non-religious items in a park, did not violate the
Establisment Clause).
362. See, e.g., Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 371 (1985) (striking shared time programs
for non-public school students); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) (holding that using
federal funds to pay salaries of public school employees who taught in parochial schools
violated the establishment clause); Parents Ass'n of P.S. 16 v. Quinones, 803 F.2d 1235 (2d
Cir. 1986) (granting a preliminary injunction to prevent a New York city school district from
providing federally funded remedial education to female Hasidic Jews in public school).
363. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 627-33 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in Justice O'Connor's endorsement analysis).
364. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1597 (1990).
365. See, e.g., Justice Stevens' unfortunate analysis in Webster v. Reproductive Health
Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3079 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part), and his remarks in
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2088, 2092 (1990).
366. See Bradley, supra note 23 (advancing this thesis).
1991]
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW
decree. Whom does this exercise serve, the individual or the state?
It may be helpful again to view the conduct exemption as "no-
endorsement-reinforcing." In the typical case, neutral legislation (say,
the assignment of a unique number to each social security participant)
has unwittingly "endorsed" some belief to the exclusion of others,
and thereby created some "outsiders." This was the situation in Bow-
en v. Roy,367 in which persons adhering to Native American beliefs
objected to their daughter's being given a number, lest her spirit be
diminished. The conduct exemption recaptures such distressed believ-
ers by the reassuring promise that the polity can, and will, accom-
modate such demands of conscience-except, of course, for cases of
utmost political necessity. The Bowen plaintiffs lost,368 as do the
great majority of the similarly situated, but the conduct exemption's
rhetoric is the important thing. It assures the plaintiff, but most of all
it assures the rest of us, that the regime really is the protector of our
religious freedom.
Again, what is the harm? The conduct exemption defeats one of
the most humbling lessons for believers: religion's remarkable capaci-
ty to obscure true moral norms. We need look no further than the
antebellum south for a profound example. Of course, the political
objective (for liberal proponents of the conduct exemption) is to polit-
ically neuter the belief that there are true moral norms. Sometimes
this results from a thoroughgoing moral skepticism; other times, it is
thought a necessary strategy to save individuals from suffocation by a
legally enforced moral code. Happily, the skepticism is unwarranted,
and the latter, costly strategy presupposes a dilemma we need not
face.
IV
The good news is that plain meaning, historically recovered,
makes ample room for individual autonomy without liberalism. Put
differently, we can have our cake (religious liberty) and a government
that recognizes and promotes true moral norms. Religion is truly a
good for everyone, and society rightly promotes it. "Religion" is a
personal relationship with a more-than-human source of meaning and
value. Religion, or the good of it for people, is intrinsically volun-
tary. As Oxford's John Finnis writes:




Coercing people to adopt or profess a religion is-if attempted for
religious motives . . . "self-contradictory." For the good of adher-
ence to the propositions of religious faith intrinsically involves that
the propositions be adhered to as true, i.e., as disclosing a transcen-
dent reality which is a fit object of adoration, petitionary prayer,
and so forth. To the extent that the propositions are professed be-
cause their profession is convenient, both they and the professing of
them obscure rather than disclose that reality.
369
"Conscience," which is harmony among a person's feelings, be-
liefs, judgments, and actions, is also a good for everyone, and society
rightly promotes it. Autonomy is a condition for realizing this good,
too. Together with Free Exercise's foreclosure of religious truth as a
ground for government action, these two goods of all persons make
for a powerful presumption in favor of freedom to act on the basis of
religious belief. Only good reasons may justify intrusion upon consci-
entious action.
I insist, however, that judges are not well suited to make these
calculations. The calculation here is not "public versus private," as it
is for the conduct exemption. The calculation is, rather, that of deter-
mining the ensemble of social conditions most conducive to realiza-
tion by everyone of the diverse, basic human goods. This complex,
prudential judgment will not be properly done by politically isolated
persons, employing the restricted reasoning of law to facts adduced in
the course of litigation.
369. John M. Fimis, Legal Enforcement of "Duties to Oneself": Kant v. Neo Kantians,
87 COLUM. L. REv. 433, 453 (1987).
1991]

